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How do governmental, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations contribute to 
successful public service provision and delivery? This dissertation provides a 
comprehensive theoretical framework of how public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations deal with environmental constraints, what management strategies improve 
performance, and how performance is evaluated. This dissertation then conducts a series 
of empirical tests in the context of U.S. healthcare. First, this dissertation investigates 
how public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations respond to increased competition in a 
service market. The findings suggest that public and nonprofit organizations tend to 
improve service quality while for-profits decrease it when they face increased 
competition. Second, this research examines whether the effects of management on 
performance vary across sectors. The findings imply that managing internal operations 
and external constraints can contribute more to service performance in for-profit 
organizations compared with public and nonprofit organizations; yet networking with 
political stakeholders tends to enhance the positive effects of external management only 
in the public sector. Third, focusing on performance assessment, this dissertation tests 
whether citizens’ perceptions of service quality are affected by organizational 
ownership. The findings imply that public and nonprofit organizations are likely to get 
less credit from citizens than their for-profit counterparts for equivalent performance, but 
this sector bias decreases in a competitive market. Taken as a whole, the findings 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
“Everyone knows business as well as governments have collected trash, swept 
streets, operated buses, managed hospitals, and run schools. Some of us are aware that 
private security firms have more employees than do municipal police departments” 
(Wilson 1989, 346). These cases raise a fundamental question in public administration: 
do private organizations provide better public services than public organizations? While 
“the best way to think about this is to ask whether we would be willing to have the same 
product or service delivered by a private firm” (Wilson 1989, 331), it is difficult to 
simply decide who should deliver services given the different standards and constraints 
between public agencies and private organizations (Rainey 2009; Wilson 1989). 
All countries face decisions about how their governments should deliver services 
to citizens, including “which sector is to do what?” (Rainey and Chun 2005, 72). Over 
the last several decades, many scholars have studied this question by looking at what 
makes public organizations distinct from private organizations and how these differences 
affect service performance (for a review, see Rainey 2009). Research on the public–
private distinction finds that public organizations compared with private organizations 
tend to: (1) face more external controls by political authorities and citizens (Boyne 2002; 
Rainey 2009), (2) have more of a bureaucratic structure and higher levels of 
centralization and formalization with more ambiguous goals (Chun and Rainey 2005b; 
Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg 1994; Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden 2001), (3) provide 




(Chun and Rainey 2005a; Rainey 2009), and (4) have multiple performance criteria that 
are ambiguous and hard to measure (Andersen, Boesen, and Pedersen 2016; Boyne 
2003a, 2003b; Walker, Boyne, and Brewer 2010).1   
Although this line of research sheds lights on the similarities and differences 
between public and private organizations, evidence on performance between the two 
sectors is inconclusive (e.g., Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010; Bel and Warner 2008). 
Moreover, while scholars have suggested that public–private differences generate unique 
constraints and opportunities for organizations, there remains a need for understanding 
how public and private organizations operate under these constraints and opportunities.  
Another knowledge gap in the public–private distinction research is the role of 
nonprofit organizations. The government has relied “more heavily on nonprofit 
organizations than on its own instrumentalities” to deliver government services, and 
“nonprofits receive more of their income from government than from any other single 
source” (Salamon 1987, 29). Despite their importance, the role of nonprofit 
organizations in public service provision has been largely overlooked (Moore 2000; 
Salamon 1987). Nonprofits are private organizations from a legal ownership perspective, 
but they are distinct from for-profits because they do not distribute income to 
shareholders. Nonprofit organizations also differ from public organizations in “the 
identification of clients and the setting of policy priorities” though both organizations 
exist to “serve the public” (Lee and Wilkins 2011, 47). As the nonprofit sector continues 
                                                 
1 A great deal of research recognizes the significant differences in work motivation and attitudes between 




to grow in terms of size and importance in society (Boris and Steuerle 2006; Hall 2006), 
further development of theoretical understanding of the nonprofit sector remains a key to 
successful public service provision.  
Should streets be cleaned by government agencies or private contractors? Should 
students be educated in public or private schools? Everyone needs healthcare at some 
point in their lives, so should the government or the private sector provide it? Will 
nonprofits do a better job in providing those services? Will the answers differ depending 
on environmental constraints or management strategies? Going beyond simply 
comparing which sector performs better, this dissertation provides a comprehensive 
picture of how public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations respond to their 
environments, how they manage internal operations and external influences to improve 
performance, and how their service quality is evaluated. This dissertation contributes to 
public administration theory and practice by advancing our knowledge of the role of 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in public service delivery, and it suggests 
practical policy implications for improving service delivery performance. 
 
1.1. Conceptualizing Publicness 
What makes an organization public? This is a central question in the public 




unpack the nature of public–private differences (Merritt 2019; Rainey 2009).2 One of the 
conventional approaches to understanding publicness is the core approach, which 
clearly distinguishes between public and private organizations by focusing on legal 
ownership (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Stark 2010). Ownership concerns whether 
organizations are “owned collectively by political communities” or “owned by 
individual and institutional shareholders” (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2011, i302). 
Scholars have highlighted the role of ownership in defending publicness and suggested 
that the different legal statuses of public and private organizations generate 
fundamentally different political environments, organizational structures, and behaviors 
(Rainey 2009).  
The second approach is the dimensional publicness approach, which suggests 
that publicness is not a single discrete dimension but rather the extent to which 
organizations are exposed to political and economic authority (Bozeman 1987; Bozeman 
and Bretschneider 1994; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Perry and Rainey 1988; Wamsley 
and Zald 1973). In addition to ownership, this approach emphasizes the interrelation of 
legal ownership, funding sources, and degree of social control. Funding sources refer to 
the degree of government funding or the degree of private funding (Bozeman 1987; 
Wamsely and Zald 1973).3 Social control reflects the degree to which an organization’s 
                                                 
2 There is also the generic approach that argues public and private organizations have more similarities 
than differences; however, this approach has been criticized for dismissing and oversimplifying critical 
public–private differences.   
3 By combining ownership and funding dimensions, Wamsley and Zald (1973) suggest that organizations 
can be categorized as: (1) government-owned and government funded, (2) government-owned but funded 
by private sources, (3) privately owned but government funded, and (4) privately owned and funded. 




behavior is constrained by political forces rather than by market forces. In other words, 
the concept reflects how much organizations are controlled “by political demands and 
regulations rather than customer demands and competitive pressures” (Andrews, Boyne, 
and Walker 2011, i302; Dahl and Lindblom 1953). Regarding political control, Bozeman 
(1987, 83) argues that “all organizations are public because political authority affects 
some of the behavior and processes of all organizations.” 
Scholars have suggested the core and dimensional approaches are “equally 
important” and “not mutually exclusive alternatives but are instead useful and even 
complementary alternatives” (Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994, 218). Later works on 
publicness suggest alternative approaches. Based on public interest theory, scholars have 
incorporated public values and public interests into the publicness discussion and 
demonstrated why economic indices often fail to adequately value social choice (e.g., 
Bozeman 2007; Moulton and Eckerd 2012). In a similar vein, Bozeman and Moulton 
(2011) present an integrative publicness model focusing on both empirical and 
normative perspectives. While empirical publicness explains “organizations on the basis 
of their mix of political and economic authority,” normative publicness “seeks to 
identify, prescribe or infuse public values” (Bozeman and Moulton 2011, i363).  
Later, Moulton (2009) suggests a framework that incorporates outcome 
publicness. Moulton’s (2009) model considers equity as performance as well as 
traditional performance indicators such as efficiency and effectiveness. Highlighting the 
                                                 
One of the contributions of Bozeman’s (1987) model is that it treats the two dimensions as a continuum 




multilevel nature of publicness, Miller and Moulton (2013) introduce environmental 
publicness into the discussion. They focus on the influences of publicness from the 
policy environment and suggest that policy environment publicness can interact with 
organizational publicness. 
 
1.2. Publicness and Performance 
Many theories and literature have studied whether public or private status makes 
a difference in performance. Public choice theory in economics provides theoretical 
expectations that free markets and freedom of choice generate superior outcomes to 
those provided by the government, and this view implies public agencies are inferior to 
private firms (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971). The economic theory of property rights 
also argues that public ownership tends to decrease efficiency (Clarkson 1972; Demsetz 
1967) because property rights are vague in public organizations and there are few 
incentives for politicians to monitor manager’s behaviors, whereas private organizations 
have owners and stakeholders with clear incentives to monitor managers (Andrews, 
Boyne, and Walker 2011).  
Political scientists also have argued that the information asymmetries between 
politicians and bureaucracies make public agencies inefficient. Political control can have 
a detrimental effect on performance if public organizations must respond to multiple 
principals who force conflicting demands on them. Market control, by contrast, is often 
thought to lead to higher efficiency, effectiveness, and customer satisfaction (Andrews, 




 On the other hand, public goods theory explains why public goods cannot be 
produced efficiently by the private sector and argues that public goods should be of 
interest to more than firms. This theory highlights the role of government in the 
production of those goods for which the market fails and expects that the government 
will produce quality public goods demanded by the median voter (Weisbrod 1988). 
Contract failure theory also stresses market failure and provides several reasons to prefer 
the public and nonprofit sectors over the for-profit sector (Salamon 1987).  
Numerous studies have compared public and private organizations within the 
functional categories, such as schools (Chubb and Moe 2011), hospitals (Brown 2003; 
Duggan 2000; Sloan et al. 2001), nursing homes (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 
2008; Chou 2002), mental healthcare facilities (Forder 2000), airlines (Backx, Carney, 
and Gedajlovic 2002), and job training centers (Heinrich 2000). These studies have not 
provided a clear answer to the question of which sector performs better. A handful of 
systematic review studies have reported no significant differences between public and 
private production (e.g., Bel, Fageda, and Warner 2010; Bel and Warner 2008; Carvalho, 
Marques, and Berg 2012; Petersen, Hjelmar, and Vrangbæ k 2018).  
Other studies have shown significant differences. In the context of U.S. 
healthcare, Campbell (1990) finds that publicly owned hospitals are significantly less 
efficient than privately owned hospitals. Later works have supported this finding (e.g., 
Cheon 2016; Chirikos and Sear 1994; Vitaliano and Toren 1996). Rosko (1999), 
however, shows a very different picture. In U.S. hospitals, he finds that for-profit 




Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2008) find that public and nonprofit providers 
outperform their for-profit counterparts.  
Answering the question of whether public organizations outperform private 
organizations is not simple, partly because “the authority to define good performance 
differs in public and private organizations” (Andersen, Boesen, and Pedersen 2016, 
855).4 Governmental organizations have a complex relationship with multiple 
governmental agencies and political authorities (Mintzberg 1973) who hold diverse 
views on performance (Andersen, Boesen, and Pedersen 2016; Boyne 2003a, 2003b; 
Walker, Boyne, and Brewer 2010). These multiple principals generate multiple—and 
often controversial—performance goals and standards, such as efficiency, equity, and 
accountability (Wilson 1987). By contrast, for-profit firms are more likely to have a 
close tie with their owners and customers, and making them happy by maximizing 
profits is an important performance criterion.5  
Even if there is consensus on performance criteria, government agencies have 
more constraints than private organizations. Wilson (1987, 331) states that “to evaluate 
the efficiency of a government agency one first must judge the value of the constraints 
under which it operates; to improve its efficiency one must decide which constraints one 
                                                 
4 Boschken (1992) defines performance indices based on the types of authority (economic vs. political), 
and the central performance question varies depending on the type of authority. For organizations resting 
on economic authority, “making customers happy” is an important performance criterion, while “meeting 
the public mandates” is the main concern for organizations under political authority (Boschken 1992, 271–
272). 
5 After reviewing studies testing the correlation between performance measures, Andrews, Boyne, and 
Walker (2006a) conclude the consensus on important performance criteria is greater in the private sector 




is willing to sacrifice.” In U.S. hospital care, Cheon (2016) supports this claim, finding 
public and nonprofit hospitals outperform their for-profit counterparts in improving 
patient satisfaction but underperform in improving efficiency. More importantly, the 
finding suggests there is a trade-off between patient satisfaction and efficiency, thereby 
implying that a large portion of costs for taking care of patients can be sacrificed to 
increasing operational efficiencies.  
Moreover, publicness is not the only factor that affects performance. Political and 
market environments, organizational structure, and management practices also 
significantly influence public service performance (Ashworth, Boyne, and Entwistle 
2010; O’Toole and Meier 2011). Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) suggest the effect 
of publicness may be contingent on organizational characteristics. This argument implies 
that organizations do not perform well simply because they are public or private; rather, 
their unique characteristics based on ownership status affects their performance. In other 
words, public ownership may interact with the external environment and internal 
operation, thereby affecting performance. This interactive relationship has been 
understudied significantly. 
 
1.3. A Trichotomy of Sectors: Nonprofit, For-profit, and Government 
Traditional literature on publicness has focused primarily on the distinction 
between the public and private sectors (e.g., Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Perry and Rainey 
1988; Wamsley and Zald 1973). Recent nonprofit sector theories adopt the concept of a 




and Powell 2006, 2). In particular, three failure theories—market filature, government 
failure, and voluntary failure—provide theoretical insight into the distinctive role of 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in the broader economy (Salamon 1987; 
Steinberg 2006).  
Market failure  
Market failure, the most well-known of the three failure theories, concerns 
“inefficiencies resulting from for-profit provision of goods and services” (Steinberg 
2006, 119). In theory, for-profit firms efficiently deliver services in a competitive market 
based on Adam Smith’s famous notion of the invisible hand. This idea is a fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics and suggests that equilibrium outcomes in a perfectly 
competitive are efficient. This proposition holds when certain conditions are met. First, 
the theory assumes perfectly competitive markets in which no individual sellers or 
buyers can control prices. Second, consumers are well informed about the quality and 
quantity of goods and services, and they behave rationally. Third, these goods and 
services are consumed individually rather than collectively.  
These conditions are not always met in the real world, and failing to meet these 
conditions is often a source of market failure. More specific examples of market failure 
include the under-provision of collective goods. Put differently, worthwhile public goods 
are underprovided because they are nonrival and nonexcludable (Steinberg 2006). Other 
examples include the over-exclusion of public goods, which means the access to public 
goods is overly restricted; the quantity or quality of goods is different from what is 





Governments seek to address market failure in a variety of ways. They solve the 
under-provision problem either by directly producing collective goods or by contracting 
with private providers (Steinberg 2006). Governments also regulate for-profit firms 
through mandates and requirements, provide selected groups with subsidies that help 
them access excludable public goods, and set the terms of exclusion to address the over-
exclusion problem (Salamon 2002b; Steinberg 2006). Such activities often lead to 
government failure or the economic inefficiency caused by government intervention in 
the context of public economics. This theory suggests government intervention to correct 
market failure can fail by creating inefficiency and leading to a misallocation of 
resources.6 
In the context of the three failures theory, the concept of government failure 
deals with a broader question: why are some citizens fundamentally dissatisfied with 
government services? In developing a theory of the role of the nonprofit in service 
provision, Salamon (1987) suggests that not only markets have inherent limitations as a 
provider of collective goods but also governments. He argues that in a democracy, 
governments will “produce only that range and quantity of collective goods that can 
command majority support” and “this will leave some unsatisfied demand on the part of 
                                                 
6 Economists including Milton Friedman have argued that market failure does not necessarily require 
government intervention to fix the problem. They contend that the costs of government failure might be 




segments of the political community” that cannot convince the majority (Salamon 1987, 
35).  
The theoretical background is the median voter theorem, which suggests that 
public service provision in a democracy will be set at the preference level of the median 
voter (Bowen 1943; Downs 1957; Hotelling 1929). In this case, at least half of all voters 
would like to see larger quantity or higher quality service, and only the middle man 
would be satisfied with the current levels of service provision (Steinberg 2006). In a 
similar vein, Weisbrod (1975) suggests that governments fail to meet the desire of some 
individuals (usually high demanders) regardless of whether government provision is 
efficient or inefficient in the economic sense. In sum, heterogeneous preferences among 
citizens lead to an “unsatisfied demand for collective goods” (Salamon 1987, 35), and 
individuals who are dissatisfied with government services are more likely to turn to 
nonprofit organizations to meet their expectations (Weisbrod 1975). 
Voluntary failure  
Inherent limitations in both market and government call for the existence of the 
nonprofit sector as a provider of collective goods (Hansmann 1981; Salamon 1987; 
Weisbrod 1975). Nonprofit organizations help solve market and government failure in 
four ways. First, unlike for-profit firms, nonprofits have little profit distribution 
motivation, and it is this nondistribution of profits that reduces incentives to provide 
low-quality services (Steinberg 2006). Second, nonprofits are often managed by 
stakeholders who care about service quality rather than financial returns (Ben-Ner 1986). 




the existence of trustworthy nonprofits may have “spillover benefits on the 
trustworthiness of competition” (Hirth 1999; Steinberg 2006, 125). Last, unlike 
governments, nonprofits are voluntary organizations without coercive power and are less 
likely to generate inefficiency in the market.  
The nonprofit sector, however, also suffers from voluntary failures such as 
philanthropic insufficiency, particularism, paternalism, and amateurism (Salamon 1987; 
Steinberg 2006). Philanthropic insufficiency explains why nonprofits have difficulties in 
addressing the under-provision of collective goods. The voluntary actions of nonprofits 
are not free from the free rider problem, and they lack reliable resources to provide 
adequate services (Salamon 1987). Philanthropic particularism refers to the tendency of 
nonprofits to focus on particular subgroups (though it can be their purpose), which could 
be a problem when it accompanies favoritism and causes wasteful duplication of 
services (Salamon 1987). Philanthropic paternalism refers to a situation in which 
volunteers treat problems as they understand them rather than as the clients see them 
(Steinberg 2006). Philanthropic amateurism indicates a lack of capacity to cope with 
human problems (Salamon 1987).   
The three failures theory does not presume which sector comes first and which 
sector comes later to respond to the other’s failure.7 The theory instead places the three 
sectors in a circle, with one sector responding to the failures of the other two (Steinberg 
                                                 
7 Weisbrod (1975) has suggested, for example, that governments and for-profits come first and nonprofits 
respond to the failures of these two sectors, while Salamon’s (1987) exposition suggests that nonprofits 




2006). This approach suggests we need to consider all three sectors simultaneously to 
understand a more complete picture of public service provision (Salamon 1987). 
Government agencies, for-profit firms, and nonprofit organizations play a unique role in 
public service provision, and each sector has its own shortcomings—yet, we do not 
know which sector can close the circle. More theoretical exploration of the role of each 
sector and more systematic empirical analysis are needed.  
 
1.4. Revisiting the Publicness Puzzle 
The purpose of this dissertation is to revisit Barry Bozeman’s (1987) publicness 
puzzle—that is, how the public status of organizations affects their behavior and 
performance. While this question may be studied in a number of ways, this dissertation 
further investigates how the public status of organizations determines their strategies to 
deal with external constraints, what management strategies can be more or less effective 
across sectors, and how performance is evaluated by citizens. Furthermore, this project 
pays attention to the unique role of nonprofit organizations based on the notion of a 
trichotomy of sectors. By incorporating nonprofits into the public–private distinction 
literature, this dissertation expands theoretical perspectives on public service provision 
through public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations. Below is a description of the 
theoretical motivations for the accompanying three essays.    
The first puzzle of this project is the role of external environments in shaping 
organizations’ behaviors. In particular, this part focuses on market constraints in public 




with increased competition in a service market. In classical economic thought, market 
competition allows consumers to choose the best possible options and drives out bad 
performers from the market, thereby contributing to the better provision of services. The 
claims for the superiority of the private sector over the public sector are based on market 
competition (Shleifer 1998). An underlying assumption here is that public agencies do 
not compete with others and enjoy monopoly status, while for-profit firms operate in a 
competitive market; therefore, only private firms benefit from market competition. In 
many public services, however, public organizations do compete with other public 
organizations as well as for-profit and nonprofit organizations, and competition does 
affect their behaviors (Johansen and Zhu 2014).  
The other underlying assumption is that the market mechanism works. Perfect 
competition in theory leads to an efficient use of resources in a free market, but this is 
rare in the real world. In many policy fields, including healthcare, there is a great deal of 
information asymmetry between service providers and consumers, which creates an 
imbalance of power in transactions and often causes adverse selection and moral 
hazards. Moreover, many service users have limited mobility. These factors often limit 
the positive function of market competition. Under this condition, does market 
competition still contribute to better service quality? When public organizations compete 
with for-profit organizations in the market, how do they respond to increased market 
competition? Is market competition better for for-profit providers than for public or 




The second puzzle is about the effect of management on performance. Numerous 
studies support the notion that management matters for performance (e.g., Ingraham and 
Lynn 2004; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000a; Meier et al. 2006; O’Toole and Meier 2011) 
and public management differs from business management (e.g., Allison 1979; Boyne 
2002; Rainey and Chun 2005). The questions then become: how does management 
matter differently across public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations? What 
management practices are more or less effective in which sector? Does the effect of 
management on performance depend on the structure? If so, does this relationship vary 
by sector?  
Among the few that address these questions, Meier and O’Toole’s (2011) work 
makes a significant contribution to the literature. They provide theoretical expectations 
on how managing internal operations and managing external constraints affect 
performance differently in public and private organizations. While their work sheds light 
on the interactive effects of publicness and management, little empirical evidence exists 
for this question. Moreover, there has been little theoretical advancement as to which 
structure can enhance the effect of management. 
The third puzzle reexamines performance. Even if public organizations 
outperform private organizations, they do not get any credit when citizens fail to 
recognize it (James and Van Ryzin 2017a). How performance is perceived by citizens is 
just as important as how organizations actually perform. Prior literature has highlighted 
that citizens’ perceptions of service performance can be affected by whether an 




organizations with inefficiency and low productivity compared with private 
organizations (Hvidman 2018; Marvel 2015, 2016). If there are negative perceptions 
towards public sector performance in general, do citizens also judge equivalent 
performance information more negatively for public organizations? Despite the 
importance, little is known whether public ownership shapes the association between 
actual performance indicators and citizens’ evaluations of performance. 
 
1.5. Research Context: Healthcare in the United States 
The research questions discussed above are investigated in the context of 
healthcare in the United States. Healthcare is one of the most salient issues in the United 
States and abroad due to its broad impacts on individuals and increasing health 
expenditures. In the United States, public, nonprofit, and for-profit healthcare 
institutions operate according to different structures and management based on their 
publicness. At the same time, they can be compared on the basis of consistent 
performance indicators.  
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (hereafter CMS), 
total U.S. healthcare spending grew 3.9%, reaching $3.5 trillion in 2017 (CMS 2018). 
That is $10,739 per person, and this health spending accounts for 17.9% of the 
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). Hospital care and nursing care are two major 
spending categories. Hospital care, for example, comprised 33% of entire health 
spending ($1.1 trillion) in 2017 (CMS 2018). While private health insurance paid for a 




for large shares of spending. Looking at health spending by major funding sources, 
Medicare and Medicaid spending totaled $705.9 billion (20% share) and $581.9 billion 
(17% share), respectively, while private health insurance spending was $1.2 trillion 
(34% share) in 2017 (CMS 2018).8 Given the amount of the health expenditure and its 
impact on society, major healthcare reforms have always been in the center of political 
debates (e.g., the Affordable Care Act).  
U.S. healthcare is not only substantively important but also provides a 
theoretically important research setting for public–private comparison. In both hospital 
care and long-term care, for-profit, nonprofit, and government-owned facilities operate 
and compete with each other in a fee-for-service market system. While a large portion of 
health expenditure comes from governments through Medicaid and Medicare, the private 
sector serves a substantial portion of clients in U.S. healthcare service. Private nonprofit 
facilities (51%) and for-profits facilities (19%) comprised more than two-thirds of all 
hospitals in the United States while public hospitals comprised less than one third (30%) 
in 2016 (AHA 2017). For long-term care, private for-profit facilities also dominated the 
nursing home industry (69%), followed by nonprofit nursing homes (24%), and public 
nursing homes (7%) in 2016 (NHC 2017). Therefore, U.S. healthcare is an example of a 
complex public service where for-profit, nonprofit, and government-owned 
organizations coexist with a mixture of public and private funding.  
                                                 
8 Some portion of that private spending is the result of either government providing healthcare for its 




Although these public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers are different in terms 
of legal property ownership, their core service production and procedures share 
similarities (Johansen and Zhu 2014). In addition, all facilities face the same set of 
regulations and laws. This setting can address one of the challenges in research on 
public–private comparisons that are differences in tasks, and industry characteristics can 
influence organizations and their management more than their publicness (Rainey and 
Chun 2005).  
Last, the standardized healthcare quality indicators also make U.S. healthcare a 
great research setting. To make an apples to apples comparison, the existence of 
comparable performance indicators across sectors is essential. In hospital care, CMS 
reports information about the quality of healthcare at more than 4,000 Medicare-certified 
hospitals across the country through Hospital Compare data. In particular, the Hospital 
Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program provides comprehensive and standardized 
performance indicators that can be applied to all hospitals regardless of their legal 
ownership. CMS participates in the Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA) to make 
performance information of hospitals available to the public and to encourage hospitals 
to improve their quality of care, support consumer choice, and enhance public 
accountability in healthcare.9 In long-term care, CMS also reports a standardized quality 
indicator (5-star quality rating) and the number of health deficiencies for all Medicaid- 
                                                 





or Medicare-certified nursing homes across the country. All information is publicly 
available through the Nursing Home Compare (NHC) website.10  
 
1.6. Three Essays on Organizational Publicness 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how public, nonprofit, and for-
profit organizations cope with policy environments, which managerial strategies are 
more effective in promoting service performance for each sector, and how citizens 
evaluate the performance of these organizations differently. The three empirical essays 
that follow discuss the current literature, provide theoretical expectations, and present an 
in-depth empirical assessment of these questions. The three essays provide considerable 
potential for extending our understanding of the role of public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations, and they provide policy implications for successful public service 
delivery. 
  The first empirical essay, “A Race to the Top or a Race to the Bottom? Market 
Competition and Regulatory Compliance Across Public, Nonprofit, and For-profit 
Organizations,” examines how policy environments affect the way public, nonprofit, and 
for-profit organizations contribute to successful policy implementation. The market 
structure of public service delivery is viewed as an important policy environment, and 
this study provides a theoretical framework for different motivations for regulatory 
compliance across sectors under increased market competition.  
                                                 




Using panel data on U.S. nursing homes, this essay empirically tests how public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit facilities respond differently to market competition. The 
findings show that increased competition promotes compliance with health regulations 
and improves service quality among public and nonprofit facilities. Competition among 
for-profit facilities, in contrast, appears to decrease compliance with regulation and 
lower the quality of services. These unexpected results challenge the current wisdom in 
public and business management that market competition works better in the private 
sector than in the public sector. These findings also suggest market competition is not a 
cure-all, but competition among public and nonprofit organizations can produce public 
policy benefits. This study raises a serious challenge to current health policy by 
demonstrating that effective service delivery in healthcare will not necessarily be 
improved by competition, particularly among private sector for-profit organizations.  
The second essay, “Management and Performance in Public, Nonprofit, and 
For-profit Organizations: An Old Comparison with a New Approach,” builds upon 
literature on the public–private distinction and the management–performance 
relationship to examine how ownership shapes the effect of management on 
performance. I expect that different external circumstances lead to the different impact 
of managerial buffering that deals with environments while different organizational 
structures affect the impacts of internal management on performance across public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit organizations. To test these hypotheses, this research focuses on 




opportunities, and buffering environmental influences, and examines how these 
management practices affect service performance.  
I conduct a series of empirical analyses by using surveys from more than a 
thousand top administrators in U.S. nursing homes along with standardized archival 
performance data. The findings suggest managerial priorities and the effect of three 
different management strategies on performance vary significantly across public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit facilities. This study contributes to the public management 
literature by advancing our understanding of the heterogeneity of managerial impacts on 
public service performance.  
The third essay, “The Case for Government Performance: How Publicness 
Shapes Citizens’ Perceptions of Service Performance,” focuses on service performance 
in the eyes of citizens. Citizens have repeatedly exposed the notion that government 
organizations are inherently inferior to private organizations (Goodsell 2004). Prior 
research suggests that citizens’ evaluations of performance in the public sector are 
weighed down by their deep-rooted negative views about the public sector (Hvidman 
2018; Marvel 2016). This research draws attention to the role of ownership in shaping 
citizens’ perceptions of service performance and explores whether citizens tend to judge 
equivalent performance information more negatively for public organizations than 
private organizations.  
This essay combines multiple data sources that include both archival 
performance indicators and service users’ satisfaction with service quality in U.S. 




closely aligned to patients’ perceptual evaluations of healthcare quality in public 
hospitals than in private hospitals. The findings show that patients’ evaluations are more 
closely associated with objective performance indicators in for-profit hospitals than in 
public or nonprofit hospitals. This finding implies that for-profit hospitals get more 
credit for quality healthcare than public or nonprofit hospitals. Additional analysis, 
however, shows this perceptual bias in performance assessment tends to fade away as 




2. A RACE TO THE TOP OR A RACE TO THE BOTTOM? MARKET 
COMPETITION AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ACROSS PUBLIC, 
NONPROFIT, AND FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS  
 
2.1. Introduction 
While private organizations operate in a service market competing for resources 
and clients (Salamon 2002a), it is often thought that governmental organizations do not 
compete with others. Despite this traditional view, public organizations are increasingly 
facing market competition in delivering public services (Johansen and Zhu 2014). 
Recent new public management (NPM) reforms promote competition in the public 
sector, and increased public expectations of service efficiency also emphasize the role of 
competition in the public sector. Despite the attention, we know little about whether 
market competition drives successful policy implementation and contributes to better 
policy outcomes. The existing literature offers little systematic evidence as to how 
market competition influences differently across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations. 
Research on sector differences has found there are significant differences in 
organizational structure, management strategies, clientele characteristics, and 
performance across public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations (e.g., Boyne 2002; 
Chun and Rainey 2005a, 2005b; Lee and Wilkins 2011; Nutt and Backoff 1992; Rainey 
2009; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Walker and Bozeman 2011). The different levels of 




(Johansen and Zhu 2014). Governmental organizations, for example, are constrained by 
formal mandates and obligations and significantly influenced by political constraints 
(Boyne 2002; Rainey 2009). Governments have a choice to make or buy, so potential 
market competition is a factor. For-profit firms, however, are primarily driven by the 
market mechanism. Market pressure plays a crucial role in setting priorities in 
managerial practices in the for-profit sector (Johansen and Zhu 2014). Nonprofit 
organizations rely on a mix of revenue sources, including private donations, government 
funding, and earned program revenues (Fischer, Wilsker, and Young 2011). Nonprofits 
therefore often face market pressure and political constraints simultaneously. 
While the effect of political constraints has been a popular subject in successful 
policy implementation, relatively less attention has been paid to the role of market 
constraints. In particular, little is known about how public and nonprofit organizations 
respond to market constraints in the process of regulatory compliance. This may be 
partly because of the view of classical theories of regulation, which suggests the 
rationale for regulation is to address market failures that occur due to natural 
monopolies, information advantage of providers, or negative externalities (Breyer 1982). 
Given that market failure is associated with inefficiencies in the for-profit provision of 
services, the literature on regulatory compliance has mainly focused on the behavior of 
for-profits rather than that of public or nonprofit organizations. Or less attention may be 
partly because most research has been conducted in the context of environmental policy, 




This essay aims to contribute to the literature by examining how market 
competition affects the regulatory compliance of service providers in the context of U.S. 
healthcare. Specifically, this study tests how competition in the elderly healthcare market 
influences facilities’ regulatory compliance using a national dataset of U.S. nursing 
homes over several years. In addition to testing the relationship between market 
competition and regulatory compliance, this study investigates how public, nonprofit, 
and for-profit facilities respond differently to increased market competition. 
The present study begins with a theoretical foundation of regulatory compliance, 
highlighting how the ownership status of regulated entities influences their willingness 
to comply with the regulation. This research hypothesizes that motivations for 
compliance vary across public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations under market 
competition. I then develop a research design to test the hypotheses and present 
empirical findings. Last, I discuss the results and conclude with limitations, 
contributions, and practical implications. 
 
2.2. Literature on Regulatory Compliance  
The question of what contributes to successful regulatory compliance has been 
extensively asked and answered. Regulation is a rule or directive made by a government 
and other authorities that is designed and operated for the better use of public resources 
and power (Stigler 1971). Compliance with regulations refers to “the extent to which 
regulatees adhere to the requirements of a given set of regulations” (May and Wood 




organizations comply with regulations, including enforcement strategies, regulated 
entities’ characteristics, motivation for compliance, and ownership status.   
Given the fundamental asymmetry of information between regulator and 
regulatees (Etienne 2014), a large stream of literature in the field has studied the tools 
and strategies that regulators can use to increase compliance. Scholars have suggested 
that variation in the use of carrots (incentive-based tools) and sticks (deterrence-based 
tools) can best describe regulatory enforcement styles.11 Along this approach, studies 
have investigated the effectiveness of different tools of enforcement, such as sanctions 
(May and Winter 1999), inspections (Beaumont 1979), funding (Weissert 2001), 
monitoring and oversight (Kauppi and Van Raaij 2014; Weissert 2001), incentives 
(Verma, Mitnick, and Marcus 1999), compliance assistance (May and Winter 1999; 
Stafford 2012), guidance and training (Kauppi and Van Raaij 2014), and campaign-style 
enforcement (Liu et al. 2015).12 Some scholars have called for a combination of 
cooperative and deterrence tools (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Scholz 1984).   
In addition to the regulators’ strategies, much of the regulatory literature has 
focused on the regulated entities’ characteristics and investigated what drives them to 
                                                 
11 A number of other distinctions have been made regarding different styles of regulatory enforcement. 
Some scholars, for example, have suggested that enforcement styles vary along with the degree of rigidity 
(May and Wood 2003, 119), ranging from “acting like consultants” (using a cooperative and facilitative 
approach) to “acting like cops” (using a coercive and legalistic approach).  
12 These studies, however, have not reached a conclusion on which is the most effective tool. After 
reviewing the existing empirical evidence on the environmental enforcement, Gray and Shimshack (2011) 
conclude that environmental monitoring and enforcement activities can generate reductions in violations 
and in emissions. May and Wood (2003), however, argue there is no direct effect of differing enforcement 
styles on regulatory compliance, but enforcement styles influence regulated entities’ knowledge of 




evade or comply with regulations. In particular, Chelius and Smith (1987) argue that 
organizational size (firm size) matters in compliance because large firms are able to have 
lower costs per unit of output of meeting regulatory requirements (based on the 
economies of scale), while small firms have higher compliance costs. Regulated entities’ 
capacity to comply, such as knowledge of rules or resources, is also a significant factor 
that can affect compliance (Winter and May 2001). Previous studies have considered 
how regulated entities’ perceptions of regulation, such as perceived fairness or 
reasonableness of regulations (May 2005; Winter and May 2002), perceived legitimacy 
of regulation (Amirkhanyan, Meier, and O’Toole 2016), and the importance of 
reputation with others (May 2005) can affect regulatory compliance.  
Scholars also have addressed the regulatees’ motivations behind compliance 
(May 2005). Winter and May (2001), for example, suggest there are three types of 
motivation for compliance—calculative, normative, and social motivations—and these 
motivations play a significant role in compliance. Based on the logic of calculated 
motivations, organizations comply with regulations when the benefits of compliance 
exceed the costs of compliance (Becker 1968; Stigler 1970; Winter and May 2001). 
Normative motivations are based on the regulated entities’ “sense of moral duty” and 
agreement with the purpose of regulation (Burby and Paterson 1993; Winter and May 
2001, 677). This perceived obligation is based on internalized values of regulation, and it 
encourages organizations to have a strong sense of “duty to comply” with regulation 
(Winter and May 2001, 678). Social motivation for compliance comes from “the desire 




(Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Winter and May 2001, 678). The interaction between 
regulators and regulated entities can influence social motivations by fostering shared 
expectations of what are the acceptable levels of compliance (Winter and May 2001). 
More recently, a small but important section of literature focuses on whether 
organizational ownership makes a difference in regulatory compliance. Konisky and 
Teodoro (2016) theorize how the logic of compliance can vary across public and private 
organizations. In the context of environmental policy, they argue that the costs of 
violation can be greater for for-profit firms than for governmental agencies because 
firms are involved in more immediate market competition and violation can reduce 
future market share and harm revenue (Badrinath and Bolster 1996; Karpoff, Lott, and 
Wehrly 2005).13 Based on this logic, they expect that governmental agencies are less 
likely to be influenced by competition from the market and therefore more likely to 
commit regulatory violations than private firms (Konisky and Teodoro 2016).  
The underlying assumption of Konisky and Teodoro’s (2016) argument is that 
public organizations do not face immediate competition for market share while private 
organizations do. It might be true for certain policy areas where direct economic markets 
for outputs are absent or limited (e.g., clean air or clean water); organizations under this 
condition often enjoy monopoly status and do not have strong incentives to respond to 
the market.14 In other policy areas, such as healthcare and education, however, mixed 
                                                 
13 The cost of violation can be defined as “a function of the risk of being penalized, the direct costs of a 
penalty imposed by the regulator, and any indirect costs that follow from violations” (Konisky and 
Teodoro 2016, 562). 
14 Utility regulation rewards investment so that higher costs generate higher profits given current price 




public, nonprofit, and for-profit markets for outputs exist, and public organizations may 
face market pressure like their private counterparts do. For instance, public nursing 
homes compete with nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes in the elderly healthcare 
market to attract more clients and increase market share. If public facilities violate health 
regulations and lower service quality, they can be penalized by poor evaluations from 
clients and by sanctions from political authorities. Despite its importance, there is a lack 
of theoretical and empirical attention to the question of whether public organizations 
more or less comply with regulation when competition exists.   
 
2.3. Regulatory Compliance and Market Competition 
Market competition can affect regulated entities’ motivations and behaviors 
toward regulation by increasing the costs of violation. In a highly competitive market, 
service providers who frequently violate regulations or lower their service quality can be 
replaced easily by other providers who perform similar jobs. In healthcare, clients in a 
highly competitive market can move to other health agencies when they learn their 
agencies have violated health standards and have decreased service quality. It means that 
regulatory violations can be easily punished in a highly competitive market. A high 
chance of being replaced under competitive markets increases the costs of violation, thus 
encouraging organizations to comply with regulations.  
By contrast, in a highly monopolistic market, it is relatively hard for clients to 
move to other agencies because only a few providers offer services. Even if service 




stay. Limited competition may make clients more tolerant of regulatory violations and 
lower quality. The reduced likelihood of being punished by clients can significantly 
decrease the costs of violation; therefore, organizations are more likely to violate 
regulations when they enjoy monopolistic status.  
Although the theory is clear that market competition increases service quality 
and improves consumer utilities, the actual impact of market competition is ambiguous. 
There is a growing empirical literature on the effect of competition on service quality, 
but empirical findings are not uniform. For hospitals, some studies find that high 
competition leads to increased quality whereas some find the opposite (for a review, see 
Gaynor 2006). For nursing homes, studies generally find that increased market 
competition leads to reduced quality. Zinn (1994), for example, shows that high levels of 
market concentration (when the market share is concentrated in a few large facilities) are 
related to higher quality service. This finding suggests that less competition leads to high 
service quality, thereby supporting the notion that enhanced competition may have a 
detrimental impact on service quality. This unexpected result “may reflect other 
structural characteristics of the nursing home market that diminish the opportunity for 
the supplier to exert power in a concentrated market” (Zinn 1994, 573). For example, 
healthcare is categorized as “a reputation good that is sold in monopolistically 
competitive markets” within a certain area (Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981, 489), and this 
unique characteristic might play a role in the nursing home market.15  
                                                 
15 Monopolistic competition is a type of imperfect competition. Providers differentiate their services from 




Using data from Wisconsin, Nyman (1988) examines how competition affects 
nursing home expenditures on patient care. His study shows that a nursing home in 
under-bedded markets is likely to spend more money on each patient if there is 
competition for patients. Although market competition is not the main interest of the 
research, Grabowski (2001) shows that market competition does not have a significant 
relationship with staffing quality and the percentage of residents with bedsores. Pointing 
out that nursing homes have competed against other community-based long-term 
facilities, Bowblis (2012) investigates how nursing home market structure and the 
expansion of assisted living facilities affect nursing home quality. Using data from Ohio, 
he finds that a greater supply of nursing homes can lead to lower quality, and assisted 
living facility market structure has a mixed effect on nursing home quality.   
While the theory suggests that market competition can make organizations 
compete on service quality and comply more with regulations, many studies have shown 
mixed results. The mixed findings may be partly due to the failure to consider different 
motivations for regulatory compliance across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations. I argue that market competition significantly affects regulatory 
compliance, but its effect applies differently across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations. Specifically, market competition can change the costs of violating 
regulations for public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations differently; therefore, these 
organizations are more or less likely to comply with regulations under market 





2.4. Theoretical Explanations 
2.4.1. Public organizations: A race to the top 
Public organizations are established by law and funded by governments, while 
for-profit organizations are owned by shareholders and rely on profits. Public 
organizations also face a complex political environment comprising diverse 
stakeholders, such as elected officials, oversight agencies, professional peers, the media, 
and the general public (Rainey 2009). Due to the fundamental differences in the political 
environment and funding sources, public organizations have motivations for regulatory 
compliance different from those of private organizations. Specifically, public 
organizations are more likely to comply with regulations compared with their for-profit 
counterparts, and market competition can increase their compliance by increasing the 
costs of violation.  
First, public organizations tend to care more about maintaining legitimacy, while 
for-profit organizations are more concerned with the opinions of stakeholders (Johansen 
and Zhu 2014). Public organizations are more likely to be committed to government 
mandates and rules, including regulations (Amirkhanyan, Meier, and O’Toole 2016). In 
addition to concerns about their own legitimacy, public organizations may view the 
regulatory authorities they are dealing with as having a legitimate right to dictate their 
behaviors (Gerstein 1970; Tyler 1990). Public organizations therefore are more likely to 
comply with regulations compared with their private counterparts.  
Second, public organizations may have a higher sense of duty to comply with 




more with regulations. Consistent with this expectation, a substantial amount of public 
service motivation (PSM) literature has suggested that public employees are more likely 
to be guided by values of ethics compared with their private counterparts (Crewson 
1997; Houston 2006; Perry and Wise 1990). Higher PSM in the public sector may foster 
the perceptual costs of violation and increase the likelihood of compliance.  
Third, reputation-based theories suggest that building a good reputation is an 
important way of maintaining external support for a public agency, and reputational 
considerations affect their behaviors (Carpenter 2010; Carpenter and Krause 2012).16 
Public organizations have a greater motivation to comply with regulations because 
meeting basic service requirements set by regulation is the first step toward a good 
reputation and positive image of the organization. Moreover, a good reputation can 
result in more autonomy and additional funding.  
As market competition increases, public organizations may feel the need to 
justify their existence and take responsibility for their actions. Public organizations 
under this pressure are more likely to make efforts to build a good reputation and signal 
to political actors that they are doing something worthy of their positions; otherwise, 
they can be privatized. Under increased market competition, maintaining good 
regulation and broad support from stakeholders becomes more important for public 
organizations.  
                                                 
16 “Reputations are composed of symbolic beliefs about an organization—its capacities, intentions, history, 
mission—and these images are embedded in a network of multiple audiences” (Carpenter 2010, 33). 
Carpenter (2010) suggests there are four types of reputation: performance reputation, moral reputation, 
procedural reputation, and techinical reputation. Agenices have to choose which type of reputation will be 




Violating regulations can do more damage to the reputation of public 
organizations than for-profit firms because a bad reputation will prevent public 
organizations from gaining broad support from external actors. Violations also can 
damage the reputation of political overseers, which leads to the lack of political support 
for public agencies. Under increased market competition, losing support from public and 
political actors can jeopardize the existence of public organizations (they can be 
privatized or sold off). The costs of violation for public organizations are expected to be 
higher than those of for-profit organizations under increased competition. 
Violating regulations can reduce government funding significantly as well as 
damage reputation. Given that a large portion of funding comes from the government, 
the costs of violation can be much larger for public organizations than for their private 
counterparts. In a competitive market, attracting clients becomes more difficult for 
service providers, and public providers in this condition tend to rely more on 
government funding. Losing government funding can be riskier, and the costs of 
violation become greater for public organizations. Based on the discussion, I expect that 
public organizations are more likely to comply with regulations compared with their for-
profit counterparts as competition increases. 
Hypothesis 2-1a. Public organizations commit fewer regulatory violations than 
for-profit organizations.  
Hypothesis 2-1b. Public organizations are less likely to violate regulations than 





2.4.2. Nonprofit organizations: A race to the top 
Nonprofit organizations are driven by market forces and public values (Johansen 
and Zhu 2014), and they have mixed motivations. On the one hand, nonprofit 
organizations need to demonstrate they serve public values to qualify for a tax 
exemption (Boris and Steuerle 2006). On the other hand, they are concerned with 
performance to attract donors and clients. Due to this unique characteristic, nonprofit 
organizations must deal with market pressure and political constraints. 
  High levels of market competition amplify the signal from the market and 
motivate nonprofit organizations to be more responsive to market forces. Their strategies 
to deal with market competition, however, are likely to differ from those of for-profit 
organizations given the different costs of violation for each sector. The costs of violation 
for nonprofit organizations can be much larger than that of for-profit organizations 
because of their unique legal status. Nonprofit organizations may lose their tax-exempt 
status when detected, and the loss of tax-exempt status can bring severe consequences to 
their financial status. Donations can be reduced because donors will be unable to receive 
a tax deduction for their gifts to the nonprofit organization and they will doubt the 
legitimacy of the organization. In addition, funding from the government can decrease 
when a nursing home violates regulations. Nonprofit organizations want to avoid 
situations that put their tax-exempt status in jeopardy or harm their financial status.  
Violations can damage not only the reputation of the nonprofit organization but 
also the reputation of its governing board. A good reputation plays a crucial role in 




Slivinski 2006; Mews and Boenigk 2013; Sarstedt and Schloderer 2010). Maintaining a 
good reputation becomes more important in a competitive market because a bad 
reputation makes it harder for nonprofits to fundraise. Due to these detrimental costs of 
violating regulations, nonprofit organizations are more likely to comply with regulations 
compared with for-profit organizations as competition increases.  
Different predominate values between nonprofit and for-profit organizations 
also lead to different strategies for handling competition. While for-profit organizations 
have more incentives to cut costs rather than improve service quality, nonprofit 
organizations are more likely to care about service quality (Eggleston and Zeckhauser 
2002). In the context of elderly healthcare, nonprofit providers are more “patient 
centered” and tend to put more value on the well-being of patients; these characteristics 
can “minimize agency problems” and improve service quality (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and 
Lambright 2008, 329). In contrast, for-profit providers prioritize profit maximization 
over other values. When competition increases, organizations in each sector are likely to 
focus on their core values (quality for nonprofits vs. profit for for-profits). Consequently, 
nonprofit facilities are likely to improve service quality and comply with regulations, 
while for-profit facilities tend to emphasize cost savings as a tool for profit maximization 
under increased market competition.  
Last, nonprofits tend to cultivate quality and carve out unique market niches so 
they can buffer against direct competition with others. For nursing homes, for-profit 
facilities are in the majority, and nonprofit facilities may target high-end clients to avoid 




clients), the service quality needs to be high to meet the expectations of high-end clients. 
Nonprofit facilities therefore have greater motivation to increase the service quality and 
greater cost of violations compared with their for-profit counterparts. In sum, nonprofit 
organizations are more likely to comply with regulations compared with for-profit firms 
as competition increases. 
Hypothesis 2-2a. Nonprofit organizations commit fewer regulatory violations 
than for-profit organizations. 
Hypothesis 2-2b. Nonprofit organizations are less likely to violate regulations 
than for-profit organizations as market competition increases. 
 
2.4.3. For-profit organizations: A race to the bottom 
While public and nonprofit organizations aim to serve the public interest, for-
profit organizations are designed to obtain profits. Private ownership rewards managerial 
decisions that enhance shareholder value (Berg, Lin, and Tsaplin 2005), whereas 
pursuing profits is not the priority of public and nonprofit organizations. Given their 
market-driven nature, for-profit organizations are more sensitive to market pressures and 
respond to incentives that increase profits compared with public or nonprofit 
organizations.  
When markets become competitive, for-profit organizations tend to control 
service costs to be efficient (Johansen and Zhu 2014). The increased competition 
provides greater incentives for for-profit organizations to maximize marginal profits and 




(Johansen and Zhu 2014). Under pressure for efficiency, one way to reduce service costs 
is to lower the service quality and save the costs of compliance. Although public and 
nonprofit organizations have incentives to respond to market competition, they have 
relatively fewer motivations for efficiency due to “the weak link between service outputs 
and marginal profits” (Johansen and Zhu 2014, 163). As market competition increases, 
the likelihood of violating regulations increases more for for-profit organizations than 
for public and nonprofit organizations.  
For-profit organizations have more motivation to reduce service costs than 
public and nonprofit organizations because the latter enjoy a cost advantage due to 
government funding and tax exemptions whereas for-profits do not (Fischer, Wilsker, 
and Young 2011). For-profit firms instead primarily rely on profits for their funding. In 
addition to higher motivations to reduce service costs, for-profit organizations have more 
autonomy and flexibility in managing costs, whereas public organizations tend to have 
more rules and procedures to adjust the service costs (Rainey 2009). In addition, public 
and nonprofit organizations often have to provide specialized services to serve specific 
groups of clients (e.g., low-income, disabled clients), which makes it difficult for them 
to control service costs (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2008). In contrast, for-profit 
organizations have more autonomy in selecting customers and managing their costs.  
 Competition may incentivize for-profits to decrease the service costs to gain a 
comparative cost advantage over others. Particularly in healthcare, extensive information 
asymmetry places limits on consumer sovereignty because it is hard for most patients to 




may have incentives to take advantage of this information asymmetry and lower the 
service quality to reduce costs.17 This incentive can be greater in an extremely 
competitive market because for-profits try to survive in the market by improving cost 
efficiency.18 Information asymmetry also exists in the public and nonprofit sectors, but 
public and nonprofit facilities are less likely to reduce their quality compared with for-
profits because they have additional costs to pay (e.g., reputational costs).  
For-profit organizations not only have greater incentives to reduce costs but also 
have fewer motivations to comply with regulations in a comparative market compared 
with public and nonprofit organizations. Government funding and donations are not the 
primary funding sources for for-profit organizations. For-profits have relatively low 
levels of reputational costs because they mainly respond to shareholders rather than 
multiple stakeholders (e.g., political actors or the general public). These characteristics 
make the costs of violation smaller for for-profit organizations compared with those of 
government and nonprofit organizations. For-profits therefore are more likely to commit 
regulatory violations than public and nonprofit organizations as competition increases. 
Hypothesis 2-3a. For-profit organizations commit more regulatory violations 
than public or nonprofit organizations.  
Hypothesis 2-3b. For-profit organizations are more likely to violate regulations 
than public or nonprofit organizations as market competition increases. 
 
                                                 
17 If there is no information asymmetry, customers would leave for-profits when they lower the quality. 




2.5. Research Context 
This chapter tests the relationship between market competition and regulatory 
compliance in public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in the context of U.S. 
nursing homes. Nursing homes make an ideal case to study regulatory compliance and 
sector differences for the following reasons. First, elderly healthcare is substantively an 
important policy area given the increasing elderly population. The number of people 
ages 65 and older in the United States is expected to more than double from 46 million 
(in 2014) to over 98 million by 2060 (Population Reference Bureau 2015). Nursing 
homes have been key providers of long-term care, and the demand for nursing home 
cares will continue to increase in an aging society.  
Second, all nursing homes face a “federally mandated and state-administrated 
regulatory regime” in the healthcare market (Amirkhanyan, Meier, and O’Toole 2016, 
2). With oversight from the federal government, states have responsibilities to oversee 
the regulatory compliance of nursing homes. All nursing homes must meet the federal 
nursing home standards and comply with state inspections to remain eligible for 
Medicare and Medicaid payments. Healthcare inspection results are important because 
not only are they associated with nursing home eligibility but also they can affect 
payment rates and other policies in the Medicaid program. This regulatory regime 
applies to all public, nonprofit, and for-profits nursing homes regardless of their legal 
ownership status, which allows comparing how public, nonprofit, and for-profit facilities 





Third, public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes provide similar services 
(elderly healthcare), but their legal ownership varies (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). 
The coexistence of all three sectors delivering similar services means all facilities 
compete in the same market. This service delivery setting enables testing of the effect of 
ownership and competition by holding constant any service type effects.19  
 
2.6. Data and Methods 
This study combines two archival datasets. First, I use the 2012–2016 Nursing 
Home Compare (NHC), a national administrative database by CMS. These data were 
created as part of the quality assessment and certification process of healthcare 
providers, and they include the latest record of inspection for each nursing home. State 
governments enforce quality standards and evaluate a nursing home’s compliance with 
regulations, quality of care, facility practices, physical environments, etc. State 
inspectors visit nursing homes every 9–15 months. NHC is unbalanced facility-
inspection level panel data. The dataset includes various nursing home characteristics, 
such as ownership status, the number of beds and residents, staffing information, and 
hospital affiliation.  
The second dataset comes from the 2012–2016 American Community Survey 
(ACS) by the U.S. Census Bureau. The ACS dataset includes various variables about 
                                                 
19 Unlike nursing homes, hospitals are more likely to compete in a segmented market based on the 
specialization. Children’s hospitals, for example, do not directly compete with orthopedic specialty 




population characteristics, such as the percentage living in poverty, the percentage of 
elderly population, and the racial composition in each county. 
This study estimates a series of statistical models to identify the effect of market 
competition on regulatory compliance across public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing 
homes. To test my hypotheses that public and nonprofit organizations are less likely 
violate regulations than for-profit organizations, the first model contains nursing home 
ownership, market competition, and various controls at the nursing home level and the 
county level. The second model includes interaction terms between market competition 
and public or nonprofit nursing homes to test sector differences in facing market 
competition. For-profit nursing homes are the reference groups in the analyses. I 
estimate models of the following form: 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛤𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛷𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝐺𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑁𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛤𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛷𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the number of violations (health deficiencies) that represents regulatory 
noncompliance; 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 is a constant; 𝐶𝑗,𝑡−1 is market competition at the county level; 
𝐺𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 are ownership variables indicating whether a facility is government-owned 
or nonprofit-owned, respectively; F is a vector of facility-level control variables, and E 
is a vector of county-level control variables described above; 𝜏𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 are state fixed 
effects and year fixed effects, respectively; and 𝑖,𝑡 is an error term. The state fixed 




regulatory administration. The year effects capture the year-specific effects, such as 
changes in federal health policy.    
Given that the dependent variable of this study—the number of health 
deficiencies—is a count variable with a positively skewed Poisson distribution, I use a 
negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors are clustered by county to address 
heteroscedasticity. The unit of analysis for this study is the individual nursing home. 
 
2.7. Measures 
Regulatory compliance  
To capture the degree of regulatory compliance, I use the number of violations 
identified during a health inspection, which is recorded as a health deficiency. The 
dependent variable here is the total number of health deficiencies of each nursing home. 
Because the variable is created using the number of deficiencies, the higher values 
indicate less compliance. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of health 
deficiencies across public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes.   
 Market competition and ownership  
Market competition is measured with the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) of 
competition, which used the number of certified beds of nursing homes in a county 
(Amirkhanyan 2006, 2008; Angelelli et al. 2003; Castle 2005). The HHI is an indicator 
of the amount of competition among service providers in the industry. The formula of 









where 𝑠𝑖 represents the market share of the provider 𝑖 and N is the total number of 
providers. To create the HHI in the elderly healthcare market at the county level, I first 
calculate the sum of squared market shares (the number of certified beds) for each 
nursing home in a county (Amirkhanyan 2006, 2008). This index theoretically varies 
from 0 to 1; and as the index approaches the value of 1, this displays the least 
competitive markets with a dominant provider. As the index approaches the value of 0, 
this indicates that the most competitive market with multiple providers have similar 
market shares.  
After creating the index, I reverse it by subtracting the values from 1, so the 
higher values reflect higher levels of market competition. Now the indicator ranges 
theoretically from zero (monopoly) to one (extremely competitive market), with an 
assumption that long-term care markets evolve and nursing homes compete with one 
another based on proximity (measured within the same county).  
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the level of market competition across time and space, 
respectively. The level of competition does not change very much over time, which 
suggests that the elderly healthcare market has been sluggish (Figure 2.1). The level of 
competition varies greatly by county, with high competition in urban areas and low 




Figure 2.1. Market Competition: Time 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Market Competition: Space  
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NHC provides various types of ownership status of sampled nursing homes (see 
Figure A.1 in the Appendix). I define the ownership of nursing homes as three dummy 
variables: public (yes = 1, no = 0), nonprofit (yes = 1, no = 0), and for-profit (yes = 1, no 
= 0). I use for-profit nursing homes as the reference group.   
Facility-level controls   
The models include various nursing home characteristics that I expect to affect 
health violations. Previous literature suggests that larger facilities are more likely to 
comply with regulations because they may have more human and financial resources to 
spend on compliance (Hanford and Sokolow 1987). To control for facility size, I include 
the number of certified beds and the number of residents in each nursing home. Capacity 
for compliance also matters in health deficiencies, and I include total nursing hours per 
resident per day to control for staffing capacity. To control for facility age, I use a proxy 
variable—years since approval to provide Medicare/Medicaid. I expect that older 
facilities more likely to comply with regulations because they tend to have more 
experience in dealing with health regulations.  
Ownership is the key variable of this research, and I also control for whether a 
nursing home had changed ownership in the last 12 months (yes = 1, no = 0). 
Certification status is expected to affect regulatory compliance because inspection 
outcomes are associated with Medicare/Medicaid certifications. I include a categorical 
variable that represents whether a nursing home is Medicare certified, Medicaid 
certified, or both. Hospital-affiliated homes indicate nursing homes’ affiliation status, 





In addition to controlling for a variety of characteristics of nursing homes, I 
include county characteristics to account for environmental factors that might have 
affected regulatory compliance. I expect that demographic and economic characteristics 
at the county level affect nursing homes’ behaviors. Previous literature has suggested 
that population density is a key predictor of health quality, and I consider population 
density per square mile (in 1,000s). Percent of elderly population is also an important 
factor to consider given that senior citizens are the main customers of nursing homes. I 
expect that nursing homes in a county with more elderly citizens are more likely to 
comply with regulations to attract more residents. The percent of white population is 
included to account for a county’s racial composition, and the percent of population 
without health insurance is included to capture insurance coverage at the county level. 
To control for economic characteristics of each county, the percent of 
unemployed population (unemployed population aged 16 years and over in the labor 
force), the percent of population in poverty (poverty status is determined as living below 
the poverty line), and the Gini index of income inequality are included. Table A.1 in the 
Appendix shows descriptive statistics for all variables.  
 
2.8. Findings 
Table 2.1 reports the estimated results from the negative binomial model with 
state fixed effects and year fixed effects. The coefficient of public nursing homes is 




deficiencies reported compared to their for-profit counterparts holding all other factors 
constant. Similarly, the coefficient of nonprofit nursing homes is negative and 
significant, suggesting that nonprofits are less likely to commit regulatory violations 
compared to for-profits.  
Interestingly, the effect size of nonprofit nursing homes is greater than that of 
public nursing home, implying that nonprofit facilities are less likely to violate compared 
with public facilities. To test whether there is a significant difference between nonprofit 
and public facilities, I run the same analysis but set nonprofits as a reference group. The 
findings show that, compared with public nursing homes, nonprofit nursing homes are 
less likely to violate regulations (tables are not shown).  
Market competition is positively associated with more health deficiencies 
holding all other factors constant. This result suggests that nursing homes, on average, 
are more likely to violate regulations under a high level of market competition. The 
result is counterintuitive but consistent with previous research, showing that less 
competition leads to higher service quality in nursing homes (e.g., Zinn 1994).  
The number of certified beds and the number of residents show an opposite 
pattern: having more beds is positively associated with more deficiencies, while having 
more residents in beds is negatively related to deficiencies. This is possible because 
these two variables capture nursing home size and the effect of one variable controlling 
for the other. Nursing homes that spend more time on their clients are less likely to 
violate health regulations. When nursing homes change their ownership status, the 




only are associated with a lower likelihood of committing deficiencies compared with 
nursing homes certified by both Medicaid and Medicare. A nursing home’s age does not 
have any significant relationship with health deficiencies.   
In addition to the nursing home characteristics, county characteristics also have 
a significant relationship with the likelihood of committing deficiencies. Population 
density, elderly population, and white population show a negative association with 
deficiencies, suggesting that nursing homes in an area with high population density, 
more elderly citizens, and white population are less likely to commit violations. Poverty 
population and the Gini index of income inequality positively related to the likelihood of 
committing deficiencies. This finding suggests that nursing homes are more likely to 
have a higher level of health violation in an area where the poverty rate and income 







Table 2.1 Regulatory Compliance Across Public, Nonprofit, and For-profit 
Organizations  
Dependent variable = The number of health deficiencies   
 Coef. Robust SE 
Public home –0.142*** (0.020) 
Nonprofit home –0.213*** (0.013) 
Lagged market competition 0.073* (0.032) 
Number of certified beds  0.004*** (0.000) 
Number of residents  –0.003*** (0.000) 
Staffing hours  –0.105*** (0.008) 
Years since certification  0.000 (0.000) 
Changed ownership 0.130*** (0.021) 
Certification: Medicare only –0.281*** (0.028) 
Certification: Medicaid only –0.034 (0.033) 
Hospital affiliated home  0.024 (0.023) 
Population density  –0.035*** (0.005) 
Elderly population  –0.007** (0.002) 
White population  –0.003** (0.001) 
Population without health insurance  0.003 (0.003) 
Unemployed population  –0.018+ (0.010) 
Poverty population  0.005+ (0.003) 
Gini index of income inequality 0.796+ (0.446) 
Constant 1.690*** (0.238) 
State fixed effects Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  
AIC 334,539.72  
BIC 335,195.14  
N 58,595  
Note. Coefficients from negative binomial regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. The reference group for public and nonprofit nursing 
homes is for-profit homes. The reference group for certification status is nursing homes certified by both 








Table 2.2 demonstrates how the effect of market competition varies across 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes. To compare whether regulatory 
compliance under market competition diverges across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
nursing homes, I include interaction terms between market competition and ownership 
variables (public and nonprofit nursing homes). The reference group therefore is for-
profit homes in the analysis. In the base regression, the effect size of market competition 
on violations in the for-profit sector (when public dummy = 0 and nonprofit dummy = 0) 
is 0.160. This means market competition positively relates with having more deficiencies 
in the for-profit sector.  
The interaction term between public nursing homes and market competition is 
statistically significant and negative. This result suggests public nursing homes are less 
likely to commit a health violation compared with for-profit homes as market 
competition increases. Similarly, the interaction between nonprofit nursing homes and 
market competition shows a significantly negative sign, demonstrating that for-profit 
nursing homes are less likely to comply with health regulations under high levels of 
market competition compared with nonprofit facilities. These findings are especially 
interesting given the theory predicts competition should work in the private sector. These 
findings remain the same when I control for the lagged number of health deficiencies 





Table 2.2. Regulatory Compliance Under Market Competition Across Sectors 
Dependent variable = The number of health deficiencies   
 Coef. Robust SE 
Public home 0.040 (0.044) 
Nonprofit home –0.001 (0.040) 
Lagged market competition 0.160*** (0.037) 
Public home × Lagged market competition –0.256*** (0.058) 
Nonprofit home × Lagged market competition –0.262*** (0.049) 
Number of certified beds  0.004*** (0.000) 
Number of residents  –0.003*** (0.000) 
Staffing hours  –0.104*** (0.008) 
Years since certification  0.000 (0.000) 
Changed ownership 0.130*** (0.021) 
Certification: Medicare only –0.275*** (0.029) 
Certification: Medicaid only –0.047 (0.033) 
Hospital affiliated home  0.005 (0.024) 
Population density  –0.034*** (0.005) 
Elderly population  –0.008** (0.002) 
White population  –0.003* (0.001) 
Population without health insurance 0.002 (0.003) 
Unemployed population  –0.017+ (0.010) 
Poverty population  0.005+ (0.003) 
Gini index of income inequality 0.774+ (0.443) 
Constant 1.607*** (0.235) 
State fixed effects Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   
AIC 334,465.90  
BIC 335,139.28  
N 58,595  
Note. Coefficients from negative binomial regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. The reference group for public and nonprofit nursing 
homes is for-profit homes. The reference group for certification status is nursing homes certified by both 








Figures 2.3–2.5 illustrate the predicted number of health deficiencies as market 
competition changes by sector. The predicted number of deficiencies is calculated using 
the Monte Carlo simulation technique through the Clarify program (see King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). After simulating parameters 1,000 
times, I calculate the predicted values for public, nonprofit, for-profit nursing homes 
respectively by setting “changed ownership” equal to 0 (no), “certification” equal to 1 
(both Medicare and Medicaid), “hospital affiliated” equal to 1 (yes), and all the other 
control variables at their means. Each figure includes 95% confidence intervals.  
Figure 2.3 shows the predicted number of health deficiencies given different 
levels of market competition for public nursing homes. The plot illustrates that the 
predicted number of deficiencies for public facilities decreases when competition 
increases. Public facilities are more likely to comply with regulations when they face a 
more competitive environment. Nonprofit nursing homes show a pattern similar to that 
of public nursing homes. In Figure 2.4, the predicted number of health deficiencies for 
nonprofit facilities decreases as market competition increases. Figure 2.5 depicts how the 
predicted number of health deficiencies for for-profit nursing homes varies along market 
competition. For-profit facilities are more likely to violate regulations when competition 
increases. These findings, in general, confirm the differences in the relationship between 
market competition and regulatory compliance across the sector.20 
  
                                                 
20 Public and nonprofit nursing homes are not only better at complying with regulations but also more 
likely to increase service quality as market competition increases compared with their for-profit 


















The analysis supports that market competition significantly affects the behavior 
of nursing homes, but an interesting question remains: who do they think is their 
competition? For-profit nursing homes, for example, may think they compete with all 
other facilities (public, nonprofits, and for-profits) in a market, or they may only 
consider other for-profit facilities as real competitors.  
To test this idea, this research investigates the effect of competition within the 
sector on regulatory compliance. I first calculate the HHI for public nursing homes, 
nonprofit nursing homes, and for-profit nursing homes separately. I then combine these 
indices to generate a measure of competition within the sector. This measure is also 
reversed so that high values represent high competition. It is noteworthy that many 




there are only one or two public nursing homes in a county. Figure A.3 in the Appendix 
shows the distribution of competition across sectors and competition within the sector.  
To test the effect of competition within the sector, I include the interaction 
between within-sector competition and ownership variables. Table 2.3 shows how 
competition within the sector shapes regulatory compliance across public, nonprofit, and 
for-profit facilities. The interaction term between public homes and competition within 
the sector is not statistically significant; however, the interaction between nonprofit and 
competition within the sector is statistically significant and negative. This finding 
suggests nonprofit nursing homes are less likely to violate regulations compared with 





Table 2.3. Regulatory Compliance Under Market Competition Within the Sector 
Dependent variable = The number of health deficiencies 
 Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE 
Public home –0.128*** (0.022) –0.094** (0.029) 
Nonprofit home –0.205*** (0.013) –0.066* (0.026) 
Lagged competition within 
sector  
0.053* (0.025) 0.120*** (0.030) 
Public home × Lagged 
competition within the sector  
  0.011 (0.054) 
Nonprofit home × Lagged 
competition within the sector  
  –0.221*** (0.038) 
Number of certified beds  0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Number of residents  –0.003*** (0.000) –0.003*** (0.000) 
Staffing hours  –0.105*** (0.008) –0.104*** (0.008) 
Years since certification  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Changed ownership 0.130*** (0.021) 0.131*** (0.020) 
Certification: Medicare only –0.278*** (0.029) –0.277*** (0.028) 
Certification: Medicaid only –0.036 (0.033) –0.039 (0.033) 
Hospital affiliated home  0.024 (0.023) 0.010 (0.023) 
Population density  –0.035*** (0.005) –0.035*** (0.005) 
Elderly population  –0.008** (0.002) –0.008** (0.002) 
White population  –0.003** (0.001) –0.003** (0.001) 
Population without health 
insurance 
0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Unemployed population  –0.018+ (0.010) –0.018+ (0.010) 
Poverty population  0.005+ (0.003) 0.005+ (0.003) 
Gini index of income inequality 0.807+ (0.443) 0.804+ (0.441) 
Constant 1.699*** (0.239) 1.646*** (0.237) 
State fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
AIC 334,542.16  334,463.67              
BIC 335,197.58  335,137.05              
N 58,595  58,595  
Note. Coefficients from negative binomial regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. The reference group for public and nonprofit nursing 
homes is for-profit homes. The reference group for certification status is nursing homes certified by 







2.9. Discussion and Conclusion 
Advocates of privatization often argue that private ownership can produce the 
public goods and services of high quality and low costs on the grounds that private 
ownership allows the benefits of market competition. Little empirical research 
demonstrates how market competition affects regulatory compliance and whether private 
organizations are better service providers than their public counterparts under increased 
competition. This essay investigates how increased competition influences service 
providers’ regulatory compliance in the elderly healthcare market and whether the 
mechanism varies across nonprofit, for-profit, and governmental organizations. By doing 
so, this study shows how successful policy implementation can be initiated and 
contributes to a better understanding of the sector differences in regulatory compliance. 
Evidence from U.S. nursing homes suggests that, on average, market 
competition fails to lead to greater regulatory compliance. More interestingly, the effect 
of market competition significantly varies across sectors—public and nonprofit facilities 
tend to comply more with regulations as market competition increases, whereas for-
profit facilities are more likely to violate regulations when they face market competition. 
Market competition not only promotes compliance with health regulation but also 
improves service quality among public and nonprofit facilities; however, competition 
discourages service quality among for-profit facilities (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). 
These findings challenge the superiority of the private sector and suggest the 
identification of privatization with the benefits of competition has been misleading 




This essay contributes to policy implementation theory by adding the role of 
market competition to widespread literature. Although policy implementation literature 
has extensively studied what makes successful implementation and what drives higher 
compliance with regulation, market factors have been missing from the discussion. This 
study shows that market competition can harm regulatory compliance in the context of 
elderly healthcare. More importantly, the cross-sector comparison of this research 
highlights that market competition can be an effective tool to foster compliance for 
public and nonprofit organizations not for for-profit organizations.  
The results of this study also contribute to the public and nonprofit management 
literature. Unlike the previous studies that cast doubt on the utility of market competition 
as a mechanism for improving efficiency in the public sector (see Salamon 1993; Van 
Slyke 2003), this research demonstrates that public and nonprofit organizations are 
sensitive to market competition. This result indicates that public management literature 
should take market factors more seriously. The findings also highlight the strong and 
positive influence market competition has on nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit 
managers should understand the market mechanism and wisely deal with this external 
factor. The nuance of the finding needs to be stressed: market competition is not a cure 
all, but competition among public organizations and competition among nonprofit 
organizations can produce public policy benefits. In contrast, competition among for-
profit firms appears to lower the overall quality of services.  
This study provides two practical policy implications for effective service 




save on service costs to be efficient, which often leads to more regulation violations and 
low quality. We need to consider how much we should leave our healthcare service in 
the private sector. The findings show that market competition can bring side effects for 
for-profit facilities and suggest that privatization (and market-based reforms) may not be 
the best solution, at least for long-term care.  
Second, policymakers should establish an effective oversight system to promote 
regulatory compliance of for-profit organizations under market competition. Designing 
reimbursement systems that encourage for-profits to increase the quality of care can be a 
solution. Currently, CMS mainly implements deterrent-based enforcement tools, such as 
fines and decertification, but adopting cooperative regulatory enforcement may also help 
prevent for-profit providers from committing violations.  
This essay provides the theoretically and practically important contributions; 
however, a few limitations remain and merit future research. First, to measure regulatory 
noncompliance, this study uses the frequency of violations and does not consider the 
severity of violations. While the frequency of violations captures the quantity of 
noncompliance, the severity of violations taps the quality of noncompliance. CMS 
provides the scope and severity index, and future research can develop a better measure 
that captures both the frequency and severity of violations using such information.  
Second, regarding market competition, this research focuses on competition 
among nursing homes rather than competition against other long-term care agencies. 
Given that an increasing number of other long-term care providers (e.g., home health 




elderly health market, competition with different types of providers is worth 
investigating.   
Third, it is worth mentioning the generalizability issue. One important element 
to consider is the level of information asymmetry. Unlike healthcare with extensive 
information asymmetry, trash collection service, for example, has relatively less 
information asymmetry. Less information asymmetry allows citizens to evaluate the 
service quality better, which may prevent for-profit providers from lowering the service 
quality in a competitive market.  
Another theoretically interesting element to consider when discussing the 
generalizability is a market structure. The empirical context of this study is U.S. nursing 
homes, where for-profit facilities are the dominant service providers. For U.S. hospitals, 
however, nonprofit providers comprise more than half of all hospitals. The difference in 
the market structure can affect service providers’ motivations and behaviors toward 
regulation. Testing the theory in the hospital context can contribute to the 






3. MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC, NONPROFIT, AND FOR-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: AN OLD COMPARISON WITH A NEW APPROACH 
 
3.1. Introduction 
An important perspective in public administration is that public and private 
organizations are fundamentally different (Allison 1979; Rainey 2009; Sayre 1958). 
Extensive theoretical discussions and empirical studies have answered the question of 
what makes public organizations distinct from private organizations and highlighted the 
public–private distinction in external environments, organizational structures and 
processes, employee values and attitudes, performance assessments, and management 
(e.g., Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2011; Boyne 2002; Chun and Rainey 2005a, 2005b;  
Rainey 2009; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Rainey and Chun 2005). Given that the 
underlying motivation of public management research is to investigate the ways in 
which managers promote performance, recent scholarship focuses on how the 
relationship between management and performance varies between the public and 
private sector (e.g., Hvidman and Andersen 2013). The debate on the public–private 
differences has been reframed from “are public organizations different from private 
organizations?” to “is the impact of management action the same in both sectors?” 
(Meier and O’Toole 2011, i283).  
Recent research has begun to address this question by providing theoretical 
expectations and empirical evidence on how the impact of management may differ in 




and decision‐making differ across sectors (Andersen 2010; Johansen and Zhu 2014; Nutt 
2005), and how performance management and leadership training matters differently in 
public and private organizations (An et al. 2018; Hvidman and Andersen 2013). Among 
these, Meier and O’Toole’s (2011) theory is promising, particularly in its careful 
consideration of how internal and external management actions influence performance 
differently in public and private organizations. Their theoretical expectations, however, 
remain untested empirically. Acknowledging the importance of this work, this chapter 
empirically tests whether public, nonprofit, and for-profit managers focus on different 
management strategies and how managerial actions shape service performance 
differently using data from more than a thousand top administrators in elderly 
healthcare.  
Based on the extensive scholarly literature on the public–private distinction, this 
study theorizes that different internal structures (e.g., flexibility of procedures, 
managerial autonomy, goal ambiguity) lead to different impacts on  internal 
management, while different external circumstances (e.g., competitive pressures, 
permeability, multiple stakeholders) lead to different impacts on management strategies 
that deal with environment across sectors. Specifically, internal management may matter 
more in private organizations than in public organizations because private managers 
operate under a less formalized structure with more flexibility in personnel procedures. 
Tapping environmental opportunities and protecting organizations from external shocks 
can contribute to program performance in general, but the former may be more effective 




This is because managers in business firms are more likely to be exposed to competitive 
market pressure that encourages innovation while managers in governmental 
organizations tend to face more political constraints that often generate more complexity 
and environmental uncertainty. 
This essay advances our understanding of the heterogeneity of managerial 
impacts providing empirical evidence that the marginal contribution of management 
strategies on performance varies across the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sector. While 
previous research mainly highlights whether public management differs from private 
management, the current study examines how management affects organizational 
performance differently across sectors. To do so, this study focuses on tangible 
managerial practices, such as managing internal operations, searching for new 
opportunities, and buffering environmental influences. This effort can provide useful 
practical implications for public and nonprofit managers as well as contribute to the 
literature. The analysis also contributes to the theories on the public–private distinction 
by adding nonprofit management. Given the significant increases in public services 
delivered by nonprofit providers, understanding the distinctive features of nonprofit 
management can contribute to theory development for public management as well as 
nonprofit management.  
  
3.2. Literature on Public Management and Performance 
The question of whether management matters for performance has been 




Heinrich, and Hill 2000a; 2000b; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Walker, Boyne, and 
Brewer 2010), nonprofit management literature (e.g., Johansen and LeRoux 2013; 
Perkins and Fields 2010; Stone, Bigelow, Crittenden 1999), and business management 
literature (e.g., Daft 2012; Ren and Guo 2011; Steffensen et al. 2019; Wooldridge, 
Schmid, and Floyd 2008). In the public management field, O’Toole and Meier’s (1999) 
public management model has been a predominant lens to explain how public managers 
influence organizational performance. Based on their theoretical propositions, a large 
number of empirical studies have supported that management makes a difference in the 
public service delivery process (for a review, see O’Toole and Meier 2011). Specifically, 
we have learned that managers’ efforts to coordinate people and resources inside 
organizations (Favero, Meier, and O’Toole 2016; O’Toole and Meier 2009), networking 
with stakeholders in the environment (Akkerman and Torenvlied 2011; Goerdel 2006; 
Johansen and LeRoux 2013; Meier and O’Toole 2003), managerial quality (Avellaneda 
2008; Meier and O’Toole 2002), and managerial stability (O’Toole and Meier 2003b) 
are key factors to promote performance.  
 Recently, the main research question in the literature has shifted from “does 
management matter?” and towards “where and when does it matter?” Recent works on 
public management have focused on the role of context in the link between management 
and performance (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 2017; O’Toole and Meier 2014).21 
                                                 
21 Context can be defined as “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and 
meaning of organizational behavior as well as functional relationships between variables” and “context 




Public management studies focusing on context can be divided into three separate 
groups. The first group has focused on the national context and examined whether the 
theory developed in the United States can apply to other countries. Empirical findings in 
the United Kingdom (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006b; Walker and Boyne 2006), 
Netherlands (Akkerman and Torenvlied 2011; Akkerman, Torenvlied, and Schalk 2012), 
Columbia (Avellaneda 2008), and South Korea (Chun and Song 2017) have supported 
the general notion that management matters.22  
The second group has focused on a policy context. Recognizing that most early 
studies use the context of secondary education, scholars have moved to test the impact of 
management in various policy areas, such as law enforcement (Kelman, Hong, and 
Turbitt 2012; Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004), local governments (Andrews, 
Boyne, and Walker 2006b; Walker and Boyne 2006), higher education (Akkerman and 
Torenvlied 2011; Akkerman, Torenvlied, and Schalk 2012), and elderly health care 
(Amirkhanyan et al. 2018, 2019). 
 The third group, an important but relatively understudied area, represents 
organizational context, which includes various structural and behavior elements.23 
Sectoral status can be an important organizational context because it can determine the 
                                                 
22 An exception is Meier et al. (2015). This study finds that specific management variables matter 
substantially in the United States but have no impact in Denmark. 
23 O’Toole and Meier (2014) provide theoretical expectations on the role of internal organizational 
contexts and political and environmental contexts. Specifically, political contexts include unitary versus 
shared power systems, single or multiple levels, corporatist versus adversarial, and the existence of 
performance appraisal systems. Environmental contexts represent the extent of complexity, turbulence, 
and munificence. Internal organizational contexts include the extent of goal clarity and consistency, the 




range of the managers’ authority and behavior. Meier and O’Toole’s (2011) work 
provides theoretical expectations that the impact of management can vary depending on 
the sector. Specifically, Meier and O’Toole (2011) expect that internal management and 
stabilization efforts should matter more in the public sector, while external management 
will be more effective in the private sector. They also argue that public managers are 
more likely to focus on internal management compared with external management, and 
the optimal ratio of internal to external management efforts will vary depending on the 
sectors. Empirical support on the different impact of public–private management is rare. 
Among the few, Hvidman and Andersen (2013) find that performance management 
improves organizational outcomes in private schools but not in public schools. 
 
3.3. The Model of Management, Performance, and Publicness 
A wide range of theories and approaches have been applied to the study of public 
management (e.g., Agranoff and McGuire 2004; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2000a, 2000b; 
O’Toole and Meier 2011; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan 2015; Walker, Boyne, 
and Brewer 2010). The foundational approach of this study to examine the relationship 
between management and performance is the management-performance model created 
by Meier and O’Toole (for a review, see O’Toole and Meier 2011). The advantage of the 
model is that it allows us to generate specific hypotheses about the effects of specific 
managerial behaviors on performance. The initial model can be expressed as: 










Where 𝑂𝑡 is performance; 𝑂𝑡−1 is lagged performance; 𝑀1 is internal management; 𝑀3 
is a managerial effort to exploit the environment; 𝑀4 is a managerial effort to buffer the 
organization from environmental shocks; S is stability (𝑆𝑖 indicates internal stability 
while 𝑆𝑥 represents environmental stability or stabilizers); 𝑋𝑡 is a vector of 




), which represents the managerial effort to network with the environment 
(O’Toole and Meier 2011). 
Based on this general model, Meier and O’Toole (2011) provide theoretical 
expectations for public–private differences in the link between management and 
performance. Additional models include subscripts “g” (government), “n” (nonprofit), 
and “b” (business) to discuss how public management is different from nonprofit and 
for-profit management.  
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Internal management (𝑀1) represents how managers operate within an 
organization to promote overall program performance. The theory suggests that the 
range (or the variation) of managerial actions inside organizations in the public sector is 
more limited than that of nonprofit and for-profit sectors. This is because managers in 




rules and procedures to follow, and agency missions restrict managerial flexibility (Chun 
and Rainey 2005a; Meier and O’Toole 2011; Rainey 2009).  
Nonprofit managers tend to have less rules and more flexibility compared with 
public managers (Feeney and Rainey 2009), but they have less available options 
compared with for-profit managers. The effect of monetary compensation, for example, 
is relatively limited given that volunteer workforces are prevalent in the nonprofit sector 
(Brooks 2002),24 while for-profit firms have various financial and nonfinancial rewards. 
In addition, managers in business firms are more likely to have discretion in allocating 
resources and managing people compared with public and nonprofit managers. 
Proposition 1. σ(Mb1) > σ(Mn1) > σ(Mg1) 
Organizations are open systems that cope with their external circumstances. 
Environments can provide both potential benefits and threats and the way that managers 
deal with their environments can directly influence their managerial effectiveness (Meier 
and O’Toole 2008). Regarding exploiting the environment (𝑀3), governmental 
organizations are more likely to be constrained by agency missions and political 
authorities, and managers in the public sector have relatively fewer options for searching 
for new opportunities (Meier and O’Toole 2011). For instance, innovation often requires 
                                                 
24 A large body of literature on prosocial motivation in the public sector (e.g., PSM) has suggested that the 
effect of monetary compensation is weak or nonexistent in public organizations (e.g., Kellough and Lu 
1993). Scholars also have suggested that monetary compensation, such as performance pay, may have 
unintended adverse consequences in the public sector where multiple principals exist and performance is 




more funds but spending more money is associated with greater levels of oversight and 
evaluation in the public sector.  
An administrative hierarchy also exists in the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit boards 
are responsible for oversight of their organizations and shape their institutional direction 
(Brooks 2002), and this system often limits managers’ tools to exploit new opportunities. 
For-profit managers, however, have a greater range of options available in terms of 
exploiting the environment (e.g., adopting new technologies or investing in other 
business) because they are less likely to face political oversight compared to public 
managers. Based on this logic, I expect that the range of managerial options in exploiting 
the environment would be larger in the for-profit sector compared with the public and 
nonprofit sectors.  
Proposition 2. 𝜎(𝑀𝑏3) > 𝜎(𝑀𝑛3) > 𝜎(𝑀𝑔3) 
Following the definition of Meier and O’Toole (2008, 933), this paper refers to 
“any of these influences that reduce the impacts of environmental forces on 
organizational or performance results as buffers” and “the dynamic of reducing such 
influences as buffering.” Buffering (𝑀4) includes several strategies, such as (1) building 
a barricade that protects internal operations from external forces, (2) a selective filtering 
of external factors and deciding what can and cannot be allowed to enter the internal 
operation, and (3) dampening the impact of external shocks (Meier and O’Toole 2008; 
O’Toole and Meier 2003a). Public organizations have massive functions to buffer 




Public managers may be able to use the well-established structures of 
governmental organizations (e.g., formal rules and procedures) to protect the 
organization’s core functions from external shocks (Thompson 1967) while private 
managers may not. The range of managerial options in buffering the environment will be 
greater in the public sector compared with the nonprofit and the for-profit sectors (see 
Meier and O’Toole 2011). 
Proposition 3.  𝜎(𝑀𝑔4) > 𝜎(𝑀𝑛4) > 𝜎(𝑀𝑏4) 
Different ranges of managerial options may lead to different effect sizes on 
performance. To test this idea, I simplify the interactive model to a linear model to 
reduce complexity and generate empirically testable hypotheses. Then, I add interactive 
terms between management and ownership. Accordingly, a simplified version of the 
model and interactive model can be depicted by the following:  
𝑂𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀1 +  𝛽3𝑀3 +  𝛽4𝑀4 +  𝛽5𝑃𝑜 + Γ𝑋𝑡 + 𝑡  
𝑂𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀1 +  𝛽3𝑀3 +  𝛽4𝑀4 +  𝛽5𝑃𝑜 +  𝛽6𝑀1𝑃𝑜 + 𝛽7𝑀3𝑃𝑜 + 𝛽8𝑀4𝑃𝑜 + Γ𝑋𝑡
+  𝑡  
𝑂𝑡 is organizational performance and 𝑆𝑖 is stability. The key interests of this study are 
managerial factors: internal management (𝑀1), exploiting the environment (𝑀3), and 
buffering the environment (𝑀4). Ownership publicness (𝑃𝑜) is added, and vectors of 
environmental factors (𝑋𝑡) are also included as control variables. The interactions 
between management and ownership are included to test whether there are different 





3.4. Theoretical Explanations for Management, Performance, and Publicness 
3.4.1. Internal management  
The distinctive internal characteristics of public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations can shape the relationship between internal management and performance 
differently. Managers in the private sector have a greater variety of internal actions to 
manage people and allocate resources, whereas managers in the public sector tend to 
have more formal procedures for decision-making and be less flexible in internal 
operations (Rainey 2009; Wilson 1989).25 Regarding personnel management, for-profit 
managers have a variety of management tools, such as monetary incentives, promotions, 
or punitive actions, while public managers have limited options due to the formal rules 
and the job security of public employment (Baldwin 1987; Rainey 2009).  
While nonprofit managers have higher levels of personnel flexibility and fewer 
constraints compared to public managers (Feeney and Rainey 2009; Hall 1992), they still 
need to negotiate personnel policies with board members and funders (Hall 1992; 
Weisbrod 1988). They may also be limited by the strong normative values of their 
employees (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011). The significant differences in the range of 
available options in managing people and resources across the public, nonprofit, and for-
profit sectors generate different levels of stress on internal management. More flexibility 
of procedures and a greater range of options encourage managers to make extra efforts 
                                                 
25 The existence of red tape (excessive and burdensome rules and regulations) is also considered a typical 
character of bureaucratic organizations (Bozeman 2000). It also generates unique internal constraints for 




on internal management in the for-profit sector; managers, in this case, will engage in a 
higher level of internal management.  
Even if there is a variety of tools available, managers cannot use them without 
sufficient autonomy. In both the public and private sectors, managers must have 
autonomy to make decisions and implement their strategies to influence performance 
(Boyne and Chen 2007; Hvidman and Andersen 2013; Moynihan 2006, 2008). While 
“private management proceeds much more by direction or the issuance of orders to 
subordinates by superior managers with little risk of contradiction” (Allison 1979, 399), 
public managers have “less freedom to react as they see fit to the circumstances that they 
face” (Boyne 2002, 101). Limited autonomy makes it difficult for public managers to 
utilize managerial tools in their organizations as well as prevents them from changing 
internal operations even if they think necessary. More autonomy in the private sector, 
however, allows managers to make the best use of their tools and enhance the impact of 
internal management on performance.  
Even if managers have feasible tools and sufficient autonomy, they need to know 
what their goals are. Higher levels of goal ambiguity in governmental organizations may 
prevent managers from maximizing the impact of internal management on performance 
(Chun and Rainey 2005a, 2005b). The lack of goal clarity can result in managers having 
to focus not on a single performance indicator but on multiple goals and performance 
criteria (Hvidman and Andersen 2013).  
Nonprofit organizations are mission-oriented entities that pursue public values 




are critical factors in improving performance in the nonprofit sector (Sawhill and 
Williamson 2001), missions and goals are often formulated in broad and abstract terms 
(e.g., improving the quality of life for all citizens), with goal complexity as one of the 
major challenges in the nonprofit sector (Alexander 1998). Unlike public or nonprofit 
managers, the fundamental concern of business managers is creating markets to enable 
earning profits, and they have a relatively clear goal—maximizing profits. The different 
levels of goal ambiguity may affect internal operations to achieve their goals across 
sectors. 
Empirical evidence also supports the idea that management matters differently in 
the public and private sector. Hvidman and Andersen (2013), for example, argue that 
performance management is more effective in the private sector than in the public sector 
due to different organizational characteristics, such as incentives, capacity, and goal 
clarity.26 Their empirical finding shows that performance management improves 
performance without bringing negative effects on equity in private organizations 
whereas it is not an effective tool for improving performance in public organizations.27 
Using a field experiment, An et al. (2018) show that leadership training is more effective 
in the public sector than the private sector, but their finding might have been a function 
of the lower level of leadership in the public sector. I expect that for-profit managers, on 
                                                 
26 Although Hvidman and Andersen (2013) focus on performance management in discussing the public–
private distinction, their arguments can be applied to the effect of internal management because 
performance management deals with managing objectives, providing feedback, and managing 
performance evaluation system primarily inside organizations. 





average, will engage in a higher level of efforts to improve internal operations of the 
organization and their internal management has a greater impact on performance 
compared with that of public or nonprofit managers.28  
Hypothesis 3-1a. For-profit managers are more likely to manage internal 
operations compared with nonprofit and public managers. 
 Hypothesis 3-1b. Internal management matters more for performance in for-
profit organizations than in public or nonprofit organizations.   
 
3.4.2. Exploiting the environment  
The amount of uncertainty and rate of change in an environment influence the 
internal functioning of organizations (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). How managers deal 
with their environments has been a key question in the public management literature 
(e.g., Akkerman and Torenvlied 2011; Johansen and Zhu 2014; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Thompson 1967). External circumstances of organizations vary across the public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit sectors, and these different environmental circumstances lead to 
different management strategies.  
                                                 
28 By contrast, Meier and O'Toole (2011) expect that internal management matters more in public 
organizations than private organizations even if the variation of internal management is larger in the 
private sector. Their logic is that the autoregressive parameter and stabilizing factors are larger in the 
public sector; therefore, the relative impact of internal management will be larger in the public sector than 
in the private sector. Whether public organizations are more sluggish and whether stabilizing factors 
matter more in the public sector, however, are empirically testable claims. The authors also note it is 
possible that the effect of internal management on performance in the private sector can be greater than 




First, private for-profit organizations are designed to be more open to market 
forces and face more competitive pressures compared with public organizations (Boyne 
2002; Rainey 2009). The competitive environments generate greater stress on innovation 
(Lynn 2005) and encourage private managers to initiate changes and seek new 
opportunities from the environment (Meier and O’Toole 2011). Governmental 
organizations typically have fewer rivals for the provision of public service and often 
enjoy a dominant position in the market, even when competition exists (Boyne 2002; 
Rainey 2009). Relatively weak competitive pressures in the public sector lead managers 
to be less likely to search for new opportunities.29  
While for-profit and public organizations are more constrained by market and 
politics respectively, nonprofit organizations face both political and market constraints 
(Johansen and Zhu 2014). This situation puts nonprofit managers in a unique position to 
be innovative relative to their for-profit and public counterparts (Moulton and Eckerd 
2012). Nonprofit managers would have fewer economic incentives than for-profit 
managers to respond to market forces and be innovative; at the same time, they would 
have greater incentives to do so compared with public managers (Johansen and Zhu 
2014). Empirical evidence also has shown that for-profit managers are more likely to 
respond to market forces and tend to prioritize service efficiency under increased 
competition compared with public and nonprofit managers (see Johansen and Zhu 2014).  
                                                 
29 Yet some studies (including the first empirical essay of this dissertation) suggest that market 




Second, governmental organizations are more permeable and easily influenced 
by political constraints that often result in frequent policy changes (Boyne 2002). The 
instability in political landscapes often brings greater uncertainty to the environment of 
public organizations, and managers under this condition are less likely to take risks and 
seek innovation. Political constraints also create the imposition of short time frame on 
public managers. The time frames of public managers are “related to political cycles of 
government” and “there is constant pressure to achieve quick results” that can bring the 
agency a larger share of appropriations (Bozeman 1987, 20).30 Furthermore, “public 
managers more often are reacting to externally imposed change rather than managing 
changes that they have had a role in formulating” (Bozeman 1987, 1). Nonprofit 
managers also are sensitive to political constraints, and they behave like public managers 
under greater political constraints (Johansen and Zhu 2014). Greater impacts of political 
constraints may make public and nonprofit managers risk averse and more conservative 
compared with their for-profit counterparts.  
Third, public organizations have a variety of stakeholders who place different 
and often conflicting demands and constraints on managers (e.g., taxpayers vs. service 
recipients); and heterogeneous preferences of multiple stakeholders generate more 
complexity in the environment of public organizations (Boyne 2002). For-profit 
organizations, however, are designed to carry on primarily for the profit of their 
                                                 
30 This problem also can appear in the private sector but for a different reason. Some criticize business for 
a focus on short-term performance (e.g., quarterly profits) rather than long-term performance due to the 




shareholders, and they have duties to shareholders. Business managers may ignore most 
constituents’ demands for input into the policy processes (Ring and Perry 1987), 
whereas constituents significantly matter for public managers. Because private 
ownership rewards managerial decisions that bring profits, managerial efforts to exploit 
the environment are likely to generate higher returns to performance in the private 
sector. Put differently, fewer stakeholders and less complexity in the environment 
encourage for-profit managers to search for new opportunities that can maximize profits.   
In addition to the heterogeneity in the external circumstances, the range of 
available tools to exploit new opportunities varies across sectors. More available options 
and greater environmental pressures lead for-profit managers to take more risks and 
actively explore new opportunities from the environment (Meier and O’Toole 2011). As 
an example, businesses firms can quit markets or more to a new one while government 
agencies are not allowed to do this generally. Exploiting actions would be more effective 
in the for-profit sector compared with the public and nonprofit sector.  
Hypothesis 3-2a. For-profit managers are more likely to exploit the environment 
compared with nonprofit and public managers. 
Hypothesis 3-2b. Exploiting the environment matters more for performance in 
for-profit organizations than in public or nonprofit organizations.   
 
3.4.3. Buffering the environment  
Governmental agencies and bureaucracies are designed to deal with uncertainty 




characterize the environments of most public organizations” (Rainey 2009, 96) and 
partly because predictability based on established rules is one of the core values in the 
public sector (Weber 1946). Public organizations, by nature, have advantages in 
institutional design that deal with uncertainties and turbulence. The existence of written 
rules, records, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) reduces uncertainty and makes 
governmental agencies more predictable organizations (O’Toole and Meier 2003a; 
Weber 1946).  
The institutional setting—complex and unstable policy environment due to the 
multiple principal problem and political instability—also encourages bureaucratic 
organizations to have more stable and predictable preferences and to be coupled with an 
incremental decision-making process (O’Toole and Meier 2003a). These are structural 
elements that help secure an organization from the external shock (O’Toole and Meier 
2003a). Given that buffering is about managerial efforts to deal with uncertainty in the 
environment, public managers within these structures have comparative advantages in 
buffering action. 
In addition to the institutional setting that encourages stability, management itself 
is more likely to engage in a set of buffering strategies in governmental organizations 
compared with private organizations (Meier and O’Toole 2008). Managers in the public 
sector may have more available options to buffer external influences. Public managers, 
for example, can operate public programs via a network of two or more organizations to 
decrease uncertainty (O’Toole and Meier 2003a). They may be able to reduce 




impact of external influences (Meier and O’Toole 2011). In addition, public managers 
tend to have more experience and expertise in buffering and more chances to learn how 
to deal with external factors over time because their environments greater emphasize 
buffering strategies (Meier and O’Toole 2011). Having a high capacity of buffering 
helps managers make better judgments in choosing which factors should be allowed to 
go into internal operations and which factors should not (O’Toole and Meier 2003a).  
Firms also protect their internal operations from environmental forces; however, 
a large group of scholars has argued that buffering strategies make firms uncompetitive 
because they weaken organizational changes and cost them financial and human 
resources (Borys and Jemison 1989; Lynn 2005). For-profit organizations may have to 
pay more for buffering in part because they do not have well-structured buffering 
institutions like governmental organizations do or because they are more likely to be 
rewarded for innovation than buffering by shareholders. The effect of buffering on 
environmental turbulence, therefore, can be larger in the public sector than the for-profit 
sector. 
Nonprofit organizations also deal with numerous types of environmental factors, 
and each social, political, and economic factor influences organizational performance in 
the nonprofit sector (Alexander 1998). Nonprofits face challenges due to external 
influences and multiple stakeholders, such as boards, volunteer and paid labor, service 
recipients, and government agencies (Feeney and Rainey 2009; Salamon 1987). In many 
cases, nonprofit organizations have intangible goals and tasks, and this unclear 




their internal operations (Alexander 1998, 274). While dealing with a great deal of 
environmental uncertainty, buffering is a common deflection strategy in the nonprofit 
sector (Alexander 1998) because they lack the capacity to respond or adopt to changing 
environments. Nonprofit organizations, for instance, tend to protect their core actives 
from external fundraising activities (Grønbjerg 1993; Thompson 1967).  
While complex environments stress buffering more in the nonprofit and public 
sectors compared with the for-profit sector, nonprofit managers have a relatively less 
structured buffering system and access to fewer options compared with public managers. 
Moreover, nonprofit organizations may be less likely to have the slack needed to act as a 
buffer. Under these conditions, nonprofit organizations deal with the changing 
environment by using more flexible responses (Bode 2003). Based on the prior 
discussion, I expect that the contributions of buffering in the public sector can exceed the 
contribution of buffering in the nonprofit and for-profit sector.  
Hypothesis 3-3a. Public managers are more likely to buffer the environment 
compared with nonprofit and for-profit managers  
 Hypothesis 3-3b. Buffering the environment matters more for performance in 
public organizations than in nonprofit or for-profit organizations.   
 
3.4.4. Managerial networking  
The ways to deal with environments are not limited to exploiting and buffering 
actions. Networking with external actors can be another managerial strategy. While the 




O’Toole model) is a ratio of exploiting the environment (𝑀3) and buffering the external 
shocks (𝑀4), I argue that managerial networking can capture another aspect of 
managerial efforts to deal with environments. If we focus on behavioral networking (a 
manager’s interaction with external actors), then the frequency of networking may tap 
the quantity of external management, while exploiting and buffering the environment 
may capture the quality of external management. Put differently, while exploiting and 
buffering the environment are the decisions about what strategies to use, managerial 
networking is the choices about whom to interact with and how often to do it. 
Previous literature also has suggested that the effect of external management on 
performance can vary depending on the direction of networking. Johansen and LeRoux 
(2013), for example, find that nonprofit managers’ political networking (interaction with 
state/local government agencies, state and local legislators, etc.) contributes to advocacy 
effectiveness, while their community networking (interaction with local business groups, 
representatives of the community, etc.) increases general effectiveness.  
Given that governmental organizations are more constrained by political 
circumstances while business firms are more constrained by market conditions, I expect 
that political networking matters more in the public sector while financial networking 
matters more in the for-profit sector. Frequent networking with the right actors may 
enhance the comparative advantages of management strategies in each sector. The 
theory suggests a greater impact of exploiting in private organizations and a greater 
impact of buffering in public organizations. I hypothesize that a public manager’s 




while a for-profit manager’s exploiting strategy would be more effective when they 
more frequently meet with financial actors.  
Hypothesis 3-4. Buffering the environment matters more for performance in the 
public sector where managers more frequently interact with political actors. 
Hypothesis 3-5. Exploiting the environment matters more for performance in the 
for-profit sector where managers more frequently interact with financial actors.   
 
3.5. Research Context 
This essay examines the relationship between management and performance in 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in the context of U.S. nursing homes. 
Nursing homes make a good case to study management, performance, and publicness for 
four reasons. First, healthcare is a viable example of a complex and elaborate public 
service, and it is substantially an important policy area given the increasing elderly 
population. As the demand for long-term care increases due to longer average life-spans, 
federal and state governments demand that nursing home managers ensure high-quality 
service with limited public funds.  
Second, nursing home ownership varies across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
homes, but they deliver similar services in the same market. All facilities operate in the 
same industry and do similar tasks, which suggests that industry characteristics and task 
characteristics can be controlled. Moreover, all public, nonprofit, and for-profit facilities 




only moderately different financial environments (Amirkhanyan, Meier, and O’Toole 
2016).    
Third, effective management has become the key to promoting quality long-term 
care (Amirkhanyan et al. 2018). Previous literature also shows that nursing home 
managers’ efforts to innovate and buffer environmental challenges play a significant role 
in improving the quality of care (Amirkhanyan et al. 2018, 2019).  
Last, a standardized archival performance matrix exists in elderly healthcare 
(e.g., service quality rating), and we do not need to rely on perceptual performance 
indicators that are more prone to cognitive biases. The standardized indicator makes it 
easier for managers and consumers to evaluate nursing home quality and for us to 
estimate the effect of management on performance across public, nonprofit, and for-
profit nursing homes. 
 
3.6. Data and Methods 
This study empirically tests the hypotheses using multiple datasets. The first 
dataset comes from the NHC database, a national administrative database by CMS. The 
datasets were created as part of the quality assessment and certification process of 
healthcare providers. The data include various nursing home characteristics, such as 
ownership status, the number of certified beds, the number of residents, staffing hours, 
hospital affiliation, and standardized quality indicators.  
The second dataset comes from Texas A&M University Nursing Home 




and May 2013, and the second survey was conducted between August 2016 and August 
2017. The sampling list included all presently operating governmental nursing homes (N 
= 903), and a random sample of 1,000 nonprofit and 1,000 for-profit homes in 2013. In 
the first survey (2013), a total of 725 nursing home administrators responded to the 
survey with a response rate of 24.97%.  
In the second survey (2016–2017), a total of 545 nursing home administrators 
responded to the survey with a response rate of 18.77 %. Out of 725 administrators who 
participated in 2013, 240 administrators responded to the 2016–2017 survey, which 
made the data an unbalanced panel dataset. I combine these two surveys, and the final 
dataset includes 1,260 observations after dropping duplicate records. The survey data 
include nursing home managers’ opinions of their managerial practices, perceived 
performance, and environmental challenges.  
The third dataset comes from the ACS by the U.S. Census Bureau. ACS data 
include county-level demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as the 
percentage of poverty, the percentage of an elderly population, and the racial component 
in each county. By merging these three databases, this study tests how the effect of 
management on performance varies across public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing 
homes. 
Because the dependent variable is a five-star quality rating that has an ordinal 
scale, I use ordered logit analysis with interaction terms to test the previously stated 
hypotheses. The models include state fixed effects to control for state-level factors and 




including a set of variables for controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by county 




Organizational performance  
The dependent variable is a nursing home’s overall quality measured using a 
five-star rating by CMS. CMS reports a standardized quality indicator, the five-star 
quality rating, for each nursing home. The five-star quality rating is a formula that 
incorporates three different sources of service quality information: health inspections, 
quality, and staffing measures. I use overall quality rating as a performance indicator for 
each nursing home. Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows the distribution of quality rating 
across public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes.    
Management and ownership  
Managerial practices in this study include internal management (𝑀1), exploiting 
the environment (𝑀3), buffering the environment (𝑀4), and managerial networking (𝑀2). 
Internal management captures a manager’s effort to oversee the internal operations of 
the organization (Meier and O’Toole 2011). Using the NHA survey responses, I create 
an internal management measure reflecting the efforts of nursing home administrators to 
involve employees in the decision-making process, be open to feedback from customers, 
and reconcile disagreements. Nursing home administrators were asked to rate these 




“strongly” disagree = 1). The factor analysis of internal management produces a single 
factor with an eigenvalue of 2.41 that is coded so higher values indicate better internal 
management. Table A.4 in the Appendix shows the factor analysis results and the survey 
questions.  
To measure exploiting efforts, the NHA survey uses questions reflecting a 
manager’s effort to adopt new ideas and practices, adopt new technology, and search for 
new opportunities. Nursing home administrators answered on a four-point scale (ranging 
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”), and the three items loaded appropriately 
on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.10 (Table A.4 in the Appendix).  
Previous research often has considered buffering as “a system component” and 
has measured the concept by focusing on outcomes (see Meier and O’Toole 2008, 938); 
however, this paper considers buffering as a management component and focuses on 
management actions. The measure is created based on the NHA survey items regarding a 
manager’s effort to respond to unexpected events and disturbances, limit the influence of 
external events, and control external factors that can affect organizations. This buffering 
measure is beneficial because it captures the degree of managerial buffering and isolates 
the effects of structural buffering. The survey items were answered on a four-point scale 
(from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”), and all items loaded on a single factor 
with an eigenvalue of 1.59 (Table A.4 in the Appendix).  
One approach to tapping managerial networking (𝑀2) in interdependent settings 
is to measure networking frequency and direction. How frequently public managers 




networking in the public management literature (e.g., Meier and O’Toole 2003, 2005; 
Meier et al. 2015). Nursing home managers were asked how frequently they interact 
with environmental actors such as state and local governments, Medicare and Medicaid 
agencies, and insurance companies on a six-point scale ranging from “daily” to “never.” 
The factor analysis produces a two-factor solution (Table A.5 in the Appendix): the first 
factor captures a manager’s interaction with financial actors (financial networking) while 
the second factor represents interaction with regulatory agencies (political networking).  
Managerial stability here is operationalized as a manager’s longevity in the 
organization. It is measured as the number of years an individual has been an 
administrator at their current nursing home. The idea is that the longer managers work in 
their nursing home, the more stability they have. On average, administrators in the 
sample have about seven years of experience in their current facilities, and public 
managers (7.65 years) and nonprofit managers (7.94 years) tend to have greater 
longevity compared with for-profit managers (5.96 years).  
Ownership is the legal status of a nursing home. I follow the CMS categorization 
of nursing homes and code all certified nursing homes into three categories: public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit facilities. All survey questions used to measure management are 
identical in both surveys. 
Facility-level controls 
The models control for various nursing home characteristics and environmental 
factors that can affect nursing home quality. Previous literature has suggested that 




to have more human and financial resources. The models include the number of certified 
beds and the number of residents in each nursing home to control for facility size. The 
quality of staffing plays a significant role in improving service quality in healthcare. I 
control for total nursing hours per resident per day capturing staffing capacity in each 
nursing home. Organizational age—years since approved to provide Medicare/Medicaid 
service—is also included because facilities with longer experiences are more likely to 
provide better service.  
Ownership is one of the key variables in this study, and the models control for 
whether a nursing home has changed its owner in the last 12 months (yes = 1, no = 0). A 
nursing home’s certification status is also controlled (only Medicare certified, only 
Medicaid certified, or both Medicare and Medicaid certified). Whether a nursing home is 
affiliated to a hospital can determine the ways facilities operate and the service quality. I 
include a dummy variable to measure a nursing home’s hospital affiliation status (yes = 
1, no = 0).  
County-level controls 
In addition to various nursing homes characteristics, the models also include 
county characteristics to control for environmental factors that may affect the quality of 
care. Both demographic and economic characteristics are considered factors that can 
affect nursing home performance. Because population density has been considered a key 
predictor of health quality, models include population density per square mile (in 
1,000s). The percent of the elderly population and the percent of the white population 




To control for economic characteristics of each county, the models include 
health insurance coverage, percent of the unemployed population (aged 16 years and 
over in labor force), percent of the population in poverty, and the Gini index of income 
inequality at the county level. Market competition is also included. Table A.6 in the 
Appendix shows descriptive statistics for all variables.  
 
3.8. Findings 
To test hypotheses on the different levels of management actions, I compare the 
mean scores by each sector for each management practice. Table 3.1 presents the results 
from one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests, and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 visually 
demonstrate the mean differences in management across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
managers.  
Table 3.1 reveals no statistical differences across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
managers for internal management. There is also no significant difference in exploiting 
the environment, although the mean value of exploiting in the for-profit sector is slightly 
greater than that of the public and nonprofit sector. The results for buffering, however, 
are consistent with theoretical expectations. Public managers are more likely to buffer 
external disturbances compared to nonprofit and for-profit managers, and this difference 
is statistically significant (F = 4.31, p < 0.014). Networking behaviors also show 
significant differences across public, nonprofit, and for-profit managers. For-profit 




p < 0.000), while public and for-profit managers are more likely to interact with 
regulatory agencies compared with nonprofit managers (F = 7.96, p <0.000).  
It is also noteworthy that the standard deviations of internal management and 
exploiting the environment in the for-profit sector are larger than those of the public and 
nonprofit sectors (propositions 1 and 2). Moreover, public managers have a larger 
standard deviation of buffering compared to for-profit managers (proposition 3).  
In sum, the evidence from top managers in U.S. nursing homes reveals that 
management strategies do not significantly vary in managing internal operations and 
innovative strategies. They do significantly vary in buffering external disturbances and 
networking behaviors.  
 
Table 3.1. Heterogeneity in Managerial Practices Across Public, Nonprofit, and 
For-profit Managers 
    
Public Nonprofit For-profit 
  




Mean  0.00 0.03 –0.04 0.41 0.663 
SD 1.00 0.98 1.02   
Exploiting  
Mean  –0.05 0.01 0.04 0.89 0.412 
SD 0.98 1.00 1.03   
Buffering  
Mean  0.08 –0.11 0.03 4.31 0.014 
SD 1.01 1.01 0.97   
Financial networking 
Mean  –0.12 –0.11 0.25 13.28 0.000 
SD 0.95 0.98 1.04   
Political networking 
Mean  0.08 –0.18 0.12 7.96 0.000 
SD 0.97 0.88 1.13   
Managerial stability 
Mean  7.65 7.94 5.96 6.94 0.001 





Figure 3.1. Management Across Public, Nonprofit, and For-profit Organizations 
 
 





























Table 3.2 reports ordered logit coefficients for three management variables. The 
results are largely consistent with previous research suggesting management matters for 
performance. Internal management and exploiting the environment are positively and 
significantly associated with higher quality ratings. Managerial stability also 
significantly contributes to service performance. Buffering the environment, however, is 
not significantly related to the quality of service in the U.S. nursing home context. 
Interestingly, public and nonprofit nursing homes significantly perform better than for-
profit homes. They tend to have a higher star-rating compared with for-profits in all 
models.  
The coefficient of facility size (the number of beds) is negative and significant 
(with a significance level of 0.1). This result suggests that larger nursing homes tend to 
have lower star ratings. Certification status matters in star-rating. Medicare-only 
certified and Medicaid-only certified facilities are more likely to perform better than 
both Medicare and Medicaid-certified facilities. This finding might result from different 
levels of goal clarity because Medicare and Medicaid-certified facilities seek to meet 
two sets of criteria, while Medicare-only and Medicaid-only certified facilities pursue 
only one set of criteria. Consistent with past research, higher population density is 







Table 3.2. The Impact of Management Practices on Service Performance 
Dependent variable = Overall quality rating  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Public home 0.473** 0.505** 0.481** 0.494** 
 (0.169) (0.171) (0.171) (0.170) 
Nonprofit home 0.672*** 0.694*** 0.685*** 0.679*** 
 (0.166) (0.167) (0.167) (0.165) 
Internal management 0.184**   0.143* 
 (0.060)   (0.063) 
Exploiting the environment  0.214***  0.177** 
  (0.062)  (0.065) 
Buffering the environment   0.021 –0.040 
   (0.058) (0.060) 
Managerial stability 0.022** 0.020** 0.023** 0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Number of beds –0.009+ –0.008+ –0.009+ –0.008+ 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of residents 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Staffing hours  0.267 0.262 0.265 0.263 
 (0.215) (0.214) (0.215) (0.214) 
Years since certification  0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Changed ownership –0.480 –0.467 –0.508 –0.449 
 (0.436) (0.434) (0.429) (0.437) 
Certification: Medicare only 0.987** 0.990** 0.988** 0.991** 
 (0.310) (0.317) (0.313) (0.316) 
Certification: Medicaid only 0.483* 0.541* 0.437* 0.562* 
 (0.225) (0.227) (0.222) (0.229) 
Hospital affiliated home –0.153 –0.154 –0.162 –0.148 
 (0.202) (0.201) (0.200) (0.202) 
Population density 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Percentage of elderly population  0.015 0.013 0.013 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Percentage of white population 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
No health insurance population –0.011 –0.009 –0.009 –0.010 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
     




Table 3.2. Continued 
Dependent variable = Overall quality rating  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Unemployed population 0.038 0.043 0.049 0.036 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Poverty population –0.048** –0.050** –0.051** –0.048** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Gini index of income inequality 3.669 3.973+ 3.964+ 3.758 
 (2.341) (2.306) (2.331) (2.316) 
Market competition 0.056 0.040 0.040 0.047 
 (0.280) (0.271) (0.274) (0.278) 
Panel data 0.156 0.143 0.149 0.150 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AIC 3,631.01 3,627.88 3,641.36 3,626.38 
BIC 4,016.43 4,013.29 4,026.77 4,022.08 
N 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,260 
Note. Coefficients from ordered logit regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. The reference group for public and nonprofit nursing 
homes is for-profit homes. The reference group for certification status is nursing homes certified by both 
Medicare and Medicaid. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.    
 
 
Table 3.3 presents how the effect of management on service performance varies 
across public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes. I include the interaction terms 
between each of management variables and public/nonprofit dummies. A reference 
group therefore is for-profits. The interaction between internal management and public 
homes is negative and significant, suggesting the positive effect of internal management 
on performance is greater for for-profit nursing homes than public nursing homes. A 
similar result is found for nonprofit nursing homes. Internal management matters more 




The result from exploiting the environment is also consistent with theoretical 
expectation. The interaction between exploiting the environment and public ownership is 
negative and significant (with a significance level of 0.1). This finding implies that 
managerial actions exploiting the environment can be a more effective strategy in the 
for-profit sector.  
An unexpected result, however, is found regarding managerial buffering actions. 
While theoretical expectations suggest that buffering can be a more effective strategy in 
the public sector, the interaction between buffering and public facilities is negative and 
significant. This result suggests that managerial buffering matters more in for-profit 
organizations. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the results from the analysis of managers’ networking 
behaviors. In Table 3.4, I split the sample and include the interaction between buffering 
actions and networking nodes. The interaction between buffering and political 
networking is only positive and significant in public organizations, suggesting the 
positive effect of buffering can be greater when public managers more frequently 
interact with regulatory agencies. This pattern does not appear in the nonprofit and for-
profit sectors. Table 3.5 shows that the interaction between managerial actions exploiting 






Table 3.3. Differences in Managerial Impact on Performance Across Public, 
Nonprofit, and For-profit Organizations 
Dependent variable = Overall quality rating 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public home 0.459** 0.504** 0.512**  
 (0.170) (0.171) (0.172)    
Nonprofit home 0.669*** 0.704*** 0.704*** 
 (0.165) (0.166) (0.169)    
Internal management 0.392***                  
 (0.117)                  
Public home × Internal management –0.311*   
 (0.154)   
Nonprofit home × Internal management –0.304+   
 (0.161)   
Exploiting the environment  0.363***                 
  (0.108)                 
Public home × Exploiting  –0.247+  
  (0.146)  
Nonprofit home × Exploiting  –0.193  
  (0.147)  
Buffering the environment   0.218+   
   (0.116)    
Public home × Buffering   –0.390**  
   (0.150)    
Nonprofit home × Buffering   –0.159    
   (0.152)    
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
AIC 3,628.65 3,628.34 3,636.93    
BIC 4,024.34 4,024.03 4,032.62    
N 1,260 1,260 1,260    
Note. Coefficients from ordered logit regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. The reference group for public and nonprofit nursing 







Table 3.4. Political Networking and Performance  
Dependent variable = Overall quality rating 
 Public Non profit For-profit 
Buffering  –0.165 0.124 0.142 
 (0.105) (0.099) (0.119) 
Political networking –0.177 –0.018 –0.219+ 
 (0.118) (0.132) (0.117) 
Buffering × Political networking  0.217* 0.196 –0.208 
 (0.101) (0.139) (0.141) 
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
AIC 1,230.93 1,273.69 1,188.55 
BIC 1,519.45 1,549.16 1,440.55 
N 430 451 379 
Note. Coefficients from ordered logit regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.    
 
Table 3.5. Financial Networking and Performance  
Dependent variable = Overall quality rating 
 Public Non profit For-profit 
Exploiting  0.116 0.307* 0.373** 
 (0.127) (0.146) (0.121) 
Financial networking  0.219 –0.414** –0.057 
 (0.169) (0.147) (0.139) 
Exploiting × Financial networking 0.059 0.097 –0.183 
 (0.160) (0.150) (0.119) 
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
AIC 1,233.59 1,265.73 1,186.50 
BIC 1,522.12 1,549.42 1,438.50 
N 430 451 379 
Note. Coefficients from ordered logit regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 






3.9. Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter revisits an old comparison—whether public management differs 
from private management—with a new approach—how public and private management 
affects performance differently. This study is one of the first to test theoretical 
expectations by Meier and O’Toole (2011), and it provides systematic empirical 
evidence on the extent to which internal and external focus of management 
actions contribute to service performance across public, nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations. In general, evidence from top administrators in U.S. nursing homes shows 
consistent differences across public, nonprofit, and for-profit management that fit with 
theoretical expectations.   
The findings presented in this research confirm the theoretical expectations that 
internal management contributes more to performance in for-profit organizations 
compared to public and nonprofit organizations. The results for exploiting the 
environment also supports the theoretical expectations that for-profit managers are more 
likely to enhance their managerial efforts to exploit new opportunities that benefit 
performance. The greater impact of internal management and exploitation of the 
environment in the for-profit sector is especially interesting given the levels of these 
managers’ actions are not significantly different from those of public and nonprofit 
managers. These results suggest that the marginal contribution of these managerial 





It is noteworthy that public managers’ efforts to buffer external influences are 
significantly higher than those of nonprofit and for-profit managers. The differences are 
more conspicuous in managers’ networking pattern—public managers frequently 
network with regulatory agencies more often, whereas for-profit managers frequently 
interact with financial actors more often than public managers. Despite the greater 
efforts of public managers to buffer the external influences, its impact on performance is 
not larger compared with the private sector.31  
Why, then, does the buffering strategy not matter more in the public sector in 
general? The analysis of networking provides a possible explanation. Table 3.4 shows 
that buffering action contributes more to performance when public managers network 
more frequently with regulatory agencies (this pattern is not shown in the for-profit and 
nonprofit sector). This result suggests the impact of buffering on performance in public 
organizations may depend on who managers interact with. Given that most of the 
uncertainty comes from political constraints, networking with their political principals 
can enhance the impact of managerial efforts to protect public organizations.   
Another possible scenario is that the effect of buffering action might be 
enhanced only when organizations have a well-developed structure that helps the 
                                                 
31 If public managers buffer more and it has a similar impact, they will actually get better results. I 
calculate the predicted probabilities of achieving high performance by sector using the different mean 
value of managers’ buffering practices in the public and for-profit sectors. The mean value of public 
managers’ buffering practices (0.08) is greater than that of for-profit managers (0.03). This difference is 
statistically meaningful (Table 3.1). When public managers buffer on their average (setting public = 1 and 
buffering = 0.08), the predicted probability of getting a 5 star is 33.8% (p < 0.000). When for-profit 
managers do it on their average (setting for-profit = 1 and buffering = 0.03), the predicted probability of 




managerial buffering function. High levels of stability in an organization can be an 
example. Public managers can reduce uncertainty by filtering of external factors or 
dampening the impact of external shocks (O’Toole and Meier 2003a); The greater 
longevity of management may help managers learn these strategies over time and 
thereby enhance the effect of buffering. Additional analysis supports this claim and 
shows that buffering has greater a positive impact on performance in public 
organizations when there is greater managerial stability (greater longevity 
of management). This pattern does not exist in nonprofit and for-profit organizations 
(see Table A.7 in the Appendix).  
It is important to point out the limitations of this work and provide directions for 
future research. First, internal management is a multidimensional concept that includes 
various elements, such as setting clear and challenging goals, building trust, encouraging 
employee participation, and providing feedback (Favero, Meier, O’Toole 2016). This 
research does not consider multiple dimensions of internal management. Exploring the 
effect of the different dimensions of internal management would make a meaningful 
contribution. This research takes the first step and further lays the foundation for 
research on the multidimensionality of internal management. Setting clear goals, for 
instance, may be more effective in the public sector given that public organizations tend 
to have more ambiguous goals, while building trust may be more effective in nonprofit 





Second, although external management actions are how managers deal with the 
environment, this research does not deeply investigate how environmental factors play in 
shaping the relationship between external management and performance. While the 
current study controls for some of the demographic and economic characteristics at the 
county level, the future study needs to consider environments and their factors more 
seriously. A public manager’s external management may be more influenced by political 
constraints, such as elections and policy changes, while a private manager may be more 
responsive to market constraints, such as industry structure and competition (Johansson 
and Zhu 2014). Future research can advance the literature by testing how political and 
market forces shape the relationship between external management and performance 
differently across the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sectors. 
Nonetheless, this study and the analysis have limited generalizability to other 
policy areas or other countries. Both policy and national context can play a significant 
role in shaping the relationship between management and performance (Meier, 
Rutherford, and Avellaneda 2017; O’Toole and Meier 2014). Further examining this 
relationship across sectors in other contexts with additional data will benefit 






4. THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: HOW PUBLICNESS 
SHAPES CITIZENS’ PERCEPTIONS OF SERVICE PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1. Introduction  
In his book, The Case for Bureaucracy, Charles Goodsell (2004, 3) states, “our 
media and politicians tell us that public bureaucracy is bloated in size, inefficient 
compared to business, a stifling place to work, indifferent to ordinary citizens, the 
problem rather than the solution.” Public sector performance has long suffered from 
negative perceptions among citizens, even though empirical evidence does not support 
the notion that public organizations underperform their private counterparts (Andrews, 
Boyne, and Walker 2011). This negative stereotype of the public sector can be 
problematic because citizens’ perceptions of government performance often determine 
their support for broad policy objectives, regardless of how the government is actually 
performing. It may limit citizens’ coproduction and thus affect effectiveness of public 
service delivery (Pestoff, Brandsen, and Verschuere 2013; Van Eijk and Steen 2014). 
Moreover, the negative perception of government and bureau-bashing is bad for the 
morale of public sector employees and has a harmful impact on recruiting individuals for 
public sector jobs (Garrett et al. 2006; Marvel 2015). 
As an effort to understand how citizens form their perceptions of government 
performance, public administration scholars have answered the question of whether 
negative stereotypes of the public sector are reflected in how citizens evaluate public 




that citizens unconsciously associate public ownership with inefficiency, inflexibility, 
and other pejoratives, and these automatic associations color their evaluations of service 
quality (e.g., Hvidman 2018; Hvidman and Andersen 2016; Marvel 2015, 2016). 
Although there is a general consensus that citizens perceive public organizations as 
underperforming their private counterparts (but see Meier, Johnson, and An 2019; 
Poister and Henry 1994), the findings on the effect of performance information on 
citizens’ perceptions are inconclusive. Some studies, for example, suggest that providing 
performance information does not completely eliminate the public sector bias, and 
citizens still think the private sector is superior (e.g., Marvel 2015, 2016), whereas others 
show that the addition of performance information does not affect how citizens evaluate 
public and private organizations (e.g., Hvidman and Andersen 2016; Meier, Johnson, 
and An 2019). 
 The mixed findings bring interesting questions about how citizens interpret 
objective performance information when they evaluate service quality, and whether 
public ownership shapes this relationship differently. If citizens have negative 
perceptions of public ownership, then do they judge equivalent performance information 
more negatively for public agencies compared with for-profit firms? If the sector bias 
exists in assessing performance, then what about citizens’ perceptions of nonprofit 
organizations? Do citizens evaluate the performance of nonprofits differently than they 
do the performance of public or for-profit organizations? What roles do market 
constraints play in shaping citizens’ perceptions of service quality across public, 




This essay seeks to address these questions to contribute to public administration 
theory and practice. First, by combining a series of archival performance indicators and 
perceptual evaluations from service users, this study empirically examines whether 
citizens’ assessments of service quality are more or less closely aligned with objective 
performance indicators in public organizations than in private organizations. Based on 
the negative stereotype regarding public performance, I expect that citizens are likely to 
evaluate public organizations less favorably than for-profit organizations for the 
equivalent performance indicators.  
Second, this research also pays attention to citizens’ perceptions of nonprofit 
organizations. Although the nonprofit sector plays a major role in delivering public 
services, there is scant attention paid to whether citizens evaluate the performance of 
nonprofits differently than they do the performance of public or for-profit organizations. 
Nonprofit ownership seldom suffers from anti-public bias, but the literature suggests that 
citizens tend to perceive for-profits as more competent than nonprofits (Drevs, 
Tscheulin, and Lindenmeier 2014; Handy et al. 2010) and prefer for-profits over 
nonprofits even in a service area where nonprofits outperform for-profits (see Ben-Ner, 
Hamann, and Ren 2018). Whether citizens give more credit to for-profit providers than 
they do to nonprofit providers for the same level of performance is an open question.  
Last, this study highlights the role of market competition in shaping citizens’ 
satisfaction with service quality. One of the theoretical foundations of anti-public bias is 
that government agencies are inherently inefficient due to their monopoly status. In 




do compete with others in a service market. Although market constraints have been 
considered as a fundamental factor that creates differences between public and private 
organizations (Bozeman 1987; Johansen and Zhu 2014), we know little about the role of 
market competition in shaping citizens’ perceptions of service quality. By bringing 
market competition into the discussion, this study explores how broader institutional 
context shapes citizens’ evaluations of public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations. 
This research addresses those questions by conducting an observational study in 
the context of U.S. hospitals. Although previous experimental research provides valuable 
insights into how citizens see public sector performance based on its strong internal 
validity, survey experiments are subject to limitations. Placing respondents in a research 
lab, for example, could potentially affect the way they process information, and their 
responses might differ if they were collected in a real setting. Survey experiments often 
focus on perceptions of service performance from individuals who have little or no 
experience with the service (Hvidman 2018). Moreover, many survey experiments on 
citizen satisfaction use vague or general questions to ask whether they are satisfied with 
service quality, which often raises the scrutiny of what this question really measures.  
This study uses archival performance data from more than a thousand U.S. 
hospitals and a random sample of adult patients with a variety of medical conditions who 
were recently discharged. Using actual quality data and responses from individuals with 
real experiences can contribute more to external validity. Furthermore, this research uses 




interpersonal care experiences to guard against the confusion and skepticism that can 
result from more general satisfaction surveys.  
 
4.2. Citizens’ Perceptions of Public Sector Performance 
4.2.1. Origins of the negative stereotype of the public sector 
Anti-public sector bias can be defined as either “the expression of negative 
attitudes in the absence of supporting evidence—that is, evidence that public sector 
organizations or employees perform poorly” or “the expression of negative attitudes in 
the presence of countervailing evidence—that is, evidence that public sector 
organizations or employees perform well” (Marvel 2015, 210). Scholars have studied the 
factors that contribute to the negative stereotype of government to understand the anti-
public sector bias better.  
First, political criticisms of bureaucracy in electoral campaigns often foster the 
negative perceptions of bureaucracy and governments (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Garrett 
et al. 2006; Hvidman and Andersen 2016). Politicians often blame governments for 
social problems and label governments and bureaucracies as efficient (Goodsell 2004). 
The political attacks against government and campaign rhetoric often lead to 
bureaucracy bashing and negative perceptions of governments (Garrett et al. 2006). The 
media also facilitates the negative image of government performance by transmitting 




or by “issue framing” (Hvidman and Andersen 2016, 113).32 Negative messages 
focusing on poor performance or policy failure are more likely to evoke more powerful 
responses than positive messages focusing on good performance or policy success (Bok 
2001; Garrett et al. 2006).  
Second, recent NPM reforms may influence citizens’ perceptions that the private 
sector is superior to the public sector in delivering public service (Hvidman and 
Andersen 2016). Under the NPM notion, public managers are encouraged to adopt 
successful management techniques from their private counterparts (Boyne et al. 2003; 
Hood 1991). NPM-style reforms have been popular in many countries, although little 
empirical research has shown that private management is superior to public 
management.33  Recent studies show that NPM reform can significantly influence 
citizens’ perceptions of public service performance (Andrews and Van de Walle 2013). 
Third, public choice theory and government failure theory have provided a 
theoretical background of criticism of government performance. These theories argue 
that (1) monopolistic government agencies are inherently inefficient and (2) public 
bureaucracies are self-interested utility maximizers (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Downs 
1967). The former view highlights the economic inefficiency in resource allocation 
caused by a government intervention, which would not exist in a perfectly competitive 
                                                 
32 Issue framing refers to the way how media presents issues regarding governments can shape the way 
citizens see their governments (Druckman and Parkin 2005; Ladd and Lenz 2009).   
33 Hodge (2000) challenges the assumption that market principals can address performance problems in 
the public sector. He also demonstrates that privatizing public service does not guarantee better 
performance. Similarly, Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2008) show that public organizations 




market. The latter approach sees bureaucrats as rational utility maximizes and concerns 
with their rent-seeking behaviors. In his seminal work, Downs (1967, 83) notes that 
“every official acts at least partly in his own self-interest, and some officials are 
motivated solely by their own self-interest.”  
Although the same logic can apply to private sector officials, what the theory 
actually implies is that rent seeking by bureaucracy can result in greater social costs of 
public goods provision (Niskanen 1971) compared to the costs caused by rent-seeking 
behavior in the private sector. In a similar vein, the budget-maximizing model suggests 
that bureaucracies want to increase their budgets (Niskanen 1971), and the bureau-
shaping model contends that bureaucracies shape their agency to maximize their 
interests (Dunleavy 1991). This logic of public choice theory may foster negative 
stereotypes of government performance. 
 
4.2.2. Empirical evidence of anti-public sector bias 
Recent research in public administration has begun to apply psychological 
theories and experimental methods to gain a better understanding of what shapes citizens 
perceptions of government performance (e.g., Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017; James and 
Van Ryzin 2017b; Jilke 2018; Olsen 2015, 2016). Noting Americans’ anti-public 
attitudes, scholars argue that “individuals’ implicit attitudes regarding public sector 
organizations are biased,” and “citizens automatically and unconsciously associate 
public sector organizations with inefficiency, inflexibility, and other pejoratives” 




In the context of package delivery in the United States, Marvel (2015) examines 
whether anti-public bias affects citizens’ evaluations of service quality and whether 
objective performance indicators can correct this bias. His survey experiments show that 
citizens have a lower expectation for the United States Postal Service (a public 
organization) than they do for FedEx (a private corporation); providing citizens with 
performance information does not completely correct this expectation bias. 
Van Slyke and Roch (2004) find that U.S. citizens are more likely to misidentify 
nonprofit organizations as governmental agencies when they are unsatisfied with the 
service quality. Their finding suggests that organizational image may be more important 
to citizens than the actual quality of the service. Not only do citizens tend to have 
negative perceptions of the performance of the public sector but also they perceive good 
performance information from government agencies as being less credible, especially if 
that information is reported by the agency itself (James and Van Ryzin 2017a). 
 Anti-public bias exists not only in the United States but also in Europe. 
Experiments from Denmark also support that citizens perceive public organizations as 
less effective and more burdened by red tape compared to private organizations (e.g., 
Hvidman 2018; Hvidman and Andersen 2016).34  This finding is particularly interesting 
given that Denmark is expected to be one of the least likely countries to harbor anti-
public biases due to higher levels of public spending (Hvidman and Andersen 2016, 
                                                 
34 It is noteworthy that these studies have employed multiple performance dimensions, recognizing that 
public service performance is evaluated by multiple stakeholders with multiple performance criteria 
(Boyne 2003b). The findings have confirmed that citizens’ attitudes toward public organizations can be 
multifaceted and may not always be negative. Citizens perceive public organizations as less effective but 




117). Using survey experiments on U.K. citizens, James et al. (2016) test the theoretical 
expectation of contracting out reducing citizens’ blame when it comes to service failure. 
They find that the use of private contractors does not reduce blaming of local politicians, 
but delegation to the local government does, noting that public agencies can be easy 
targets for blame when politicians seek to avoid blame from citizens (James et al. 2016; 
see also Marvel and Girth 2016). 
While these studies have supported the negative perceptions of public sector 
performance, other experimental studies provide the opposite results. Based on the 
theories of blame attribution, Johnson, Geva, and Meier (2019) test whether the use of 
private contractors influences blame attribution by the mass public. In the context of 
military contracting, they find that the American public prefers government soldiers over 
private security contractors, contrasting with the existing literature suggesting the public 
would prefer the private sector over the public sector. This finding highlights that policy 
context matters for shaping citizens’ perceptions of the public sector, and public 
agencies may have images that evoke positive emotions among citizens (Teodoro and 
An 2018).  
 
4.3.  Objective and Subjective Assessment of Service Performance 
While we have learned that public ownership has a negative stereotype and this 
bias often colors citizens’ assessments of public sector performance (e.g., Marvel 2015, 
2016), the literature on public performance has shown that citizen satisfaction is in 




assessments do reflect real service quality. Specifically, much of the discussion of 
performance measurement has focused on whether objective performance indicators are 
associated with subjective performance measures, including citizens’ perceptual 
evaluations (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006a; Favero and Meier 2013). Objective 
performance indicators include administrative records of performance and archival 
materials of performance, while subjective measures represent the perceptual judgments 
of performance made by stakeholders, such as citizens’ evaluations of service (Brewer 
2006; Selden and Sowa 2004; Walker and Boyne 2006).35 A strong association between 
objective and subjective measures supports the convergent validity of these two types of 
performance data. A lack of congruence between the two types of performance 
indicators could occur because citizens pick up different aspects of performance from 
governments (Campbell and Fiske 1959) or because citizens’ evaluations of public 
sector performance are biased (Andersen and Hjortskov 2016).  
Many empirical works have shown that objective performance indicators are 
significantly associated with citizens’ evaluations of service quality. In secondary 
education, for example, archival school quality indicators, such as student academic 
                                                 
35 Objective measures are believed to reflect an element of real performance and are seen as “impartial, 
independent, and detached from the unit of analysis” (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006a, 16). Objective 
measures, however, often fail to fully capture performance accurately because they are often selected 
based on availability (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2014; Chun and Rainey 2005) and often ignore 
performance elements that are not quantifiable but matter for citizens (Moynihan 2008). Even with the 
wide use of subjective measures, subjective measures are criticized that they may be “biased or 
prejudiced” (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006a, 17), and they often suffer from common source bias 
(Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2014; Brewer 2006; Favero and Bullock 2015; Meier and O'Toole 
2013a, 2013b). Given that both measures have limitations, one way to improve performance assessment is 
to use “a combination of subjective and objective performance measures to compensate for the 




achievement and progress report scores, are positively associated with parents’ 
satisfaction with schools (e.g., Charbonneau and Van Ryzin 2012; Favero and Meier 
2013; Song and Meier 2018). Citizen satisfaction and street cleanliness ratings are also 
significantly related to each other, supporting that citizens’ evaluations capture the actual 
quality of public service (Van Ryzin, Immerwahr, and Altman 2008).36   
A consistent association between objective performance indicators and citizens’ 
perceptual evaluations is also found in healthcare despite the extensive information 
asymmetry (Anhang Price et al. 2014). In U.S. hospitals, for example, Cheon et al. 
(2019) show that patient satisfaction is commonly explained by objective hospital 
performance indicators, such as clinical process scores and 30-day readmission rates. 
With a sample of surgical hospitals, Tsai, Orav, and Jha (2015) also show that patients 
are more satisfied in hospitals that provide high quality and efficient surgical care with 
shorter lengths of stay, higher surgical process quality, lower surgical readmission rates, 
and lower mortality rates.  
 
4.4. Theoretical Expectations 
4.4.1. Citizens’ evaluations of service performance 
The previous literature has shown that citizens’ evaluations do reflect the actual 
quality of public service, suggesting that citizens are able to make sound judgments 
regarding service performance. The literature on the anti-public bias, however, suggests 
                                                 
36 Some studies, however, suggest a weak relationship between archival measures of performance and 




that not only do citizens perceive the performance of public organizations more 
negatively compared to private organizations but also they interpret performance 
information with a bias against the public sector. Marvel (2015), for example, shows that 
citizens rate public and private organizations differently based on identical favorable 
performance information. Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) argue that prior beliefs 
(specifically, attitudes toward public service provision) systematically bias the way 
individuals process performance information. Their experiment in a Danish hospital 
setting supports this claim, showing that citizens tend to judge identical performance 
information differently based on their prior preference for the public or private sector 
(Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2016). If citizens interpret objective performance information 
based on their prior beliefs, and if their prior beliefs are biased against the public sector, 
an association between objective performance indicators and citizens’ evaluations would 
be weaker for public organizations than for private organizations. Put differently, due to 
the anti-public bias, citizens tend to give less favorable evaluations to public 
organizations compared with private organizations for the equivalent performance 
indicators.  
Different levels of expectations for public and private organizations may also 
play a role in shaping citizens’ perceptions. Public organizations may get less credit than 
their private counterparts for equivalent service quality because citizens tend to have a 
higher expectation of the public sector and often apply higher standards to public 




may expect public organizations to be both efficient and equitable in the service delivery 
process, whereas they may expect private organizations to be efficient only.  
Based on the expectancy-disconfirmation model (EDM), citizens are likely to be 
dissatisfied when perceived performance falls short of their expectations, whereas they 
are likely to be satisfied when perceived performance exceeds expectations (Jacobsen, 
Snyder, and Saultz 2015; James 2009; Morgeson 2013; Poister and Thomas 2011; Van 
Ryzin 2004, 2006, 2013). Even if public and private organizations provide equivalent 
service, citizens would be less satisfied with public organizations when they have higher 
normative expectations for public agencies because the gap between the prior 
expectation and the experience of service quality would be large for public agencies.37  
Perceptual bias also exists in citizens’ evaluations of nonprofit sector 
performance. Studies have found that citizens tend to associate nonprofit organizations 
with trustworthiness and warmth, and for-profit organizations with effectiveness and 
competence (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010; Drevs, Tscheulin, and Lindenmeier 
2014; Handy et al. 2010; Schlesinger, Mitchell, and Gray 2004a, 2004b). Scholars also 
suggest that nonprofit ownership does not seem to be used as a signal of high quality 
(Malani and David 2008), and service users often choose for-profit over nonprofit 
providers even when nonprofits outperform for-profits (Ben-Ner, Hamann, and Ren 
2018).  
                                                 
37 Citizen expectations can play a key role in shaping their perceptions of service performance (Jacobsen, 
Snyder, and Saultz 2015; Poister and Thomas 2011). James (2011, 1420) notes that expectations include 
both a normative element (“what citizens think performance should be”) and a positive element (“what 




One interesting condition that may facilitate the sector bias in the perceptions of 
performance is the level of information asymmetry. Ben-Ner, Hamann, and Ren (2018) 
argue that individuals are more likely to use ownership as a quality signal in a policy 
area with a great deal of information asymmetry, such as healthcare. In elderly 
healthcare, for example, they show that consumers who use ownership as a selection 
criterion are more likely to choose for-profit over nonprofit nursing homes even though 
nonprofit facilities are superior in the quality of care.38 In the choice between for-profit 
and government-owned facilities, those who choose on the basis of ownership status are 
more likely to end up in for-profit facilities over government-owned facilities because 
they perceive the for-profit sector to be superior.  
Overall, previous studies have suggested that ownership plays a significant role 
in shaping citizens’ perceptions of service performance regardless of actual quality. The 
current study focuses on the relationship between objective quality indicators and service 
users’ perceptual evaluations in hospitals where information asymmetry is high and tests 
whether public ownership influences this link. Based on the previous findings supporting 
a significant association between objective performance indicators and perceptual 
evaluations in healthcare (Cheon et al. 2019; Tsai et al. 2015), I first expect that archival 
hospital performance indicators are significantly related to patient satisfaction in general. 
I then hypothesize that patients are likely to evaluate public hospitals as less favorable 
than for-profit hospitals for the equivalent quality indicators due to the extensive 
                                                 




information asymmetry and the anti-public sector bias. Similarly, I hypothesize that 
nonprofit hospitals would get less credit for equivalent performance than for-profit 
hospitals given the perceptions of the superiority of for-profit over nonprofit ownership.  
Hypothesis 4-1a. The relationship between objective performance indicators and 
patients’ evaluations of service quality in public hospitals will be weaker than in 
for-profit hospitals. 
Hypothesis 4-1b. The relationship between objective performance indicators and 
patients’ evaluations of service quality in nonprofit hospitals will be weaker than 
in for-profit hospitals. 
 
4.4.2. Market competition and citizens’ evaluations of performance 
In many policy areas, public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers coexist, deliver 
similar services, and compete with each other for resources and clients in the same 
market. External market constraints often lead these organizations to pursue different 
strategies (Johansen and Zhu 2014), and these constraints may influence how citizens 
see service providers. As market competition increases, organizations seek a 
comparative advantage over others by either raising the service quality or lowering the 
service price. The quality and price distribution in equilibrium depends on a large 
number of factors, such as organizational size, resources, and related costs, but 
ownership status can be also a crucial factor.  
Unlike for-profit organizations that focus on maximizing profit, government-




tend to be subject to greater political oversight (Rainey 2009). Public organizations may 
also be under greater public pressure to provide quality service and set a good example 
in a market that prevents them from lowering service quality. Making a profit is also not 
the priority of nonprofits, and particularly the prohibition on distribution of profits to 
members may reduce incentives to lower costs and service quality even in a competitive 
market. Instead, nonprofit organizations tend to be more dedicated to their mission and 
goals related to service quality and patient well-being as competition increases.  
Some nonprofits may be controlled by consumers who care about quality service, 
which prevents them from lowering the quality (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen 1991; 
Weisbrod 1988). Moreover, nonprofits also face oversight from their boards of directors, 
who care about reputation and are less likely to lower the quality (Brooks 2002). For-
profits, by contrast, are more likely to focus on service costs and maximize profit as 
competition increases.39 In sum, public and nonprofit organizations tend to focus on 
quality, while for-profit organizations tend to prioritize efficiency in a competitive 
market (Johansen and Zhu 2014).  
In a service area with extensive information asymmetry, divergence in strategies 
to deal with market competition can be more conspicuous. In healthcare, for example, 
service providers have better knowledge of the essential attributes of their healthcare 
quality than patients do, and this situation offers the opportunity to exploit their superior 
information (Ben-Ner, Hamann, and Ren 2018). For-profit providers may have greater 
                                                 
39 But there might be exceptions to this claim. Service markets can be segmented, and the segmentation 




incentives to derive benefit from asymmetric information to attract more clients with 
reduced costs as competition increases (Spector, Selden, and Cohen 1998). This would 
make more sense to offer lower quality and take the profits if customers cannot judge 
quality.  
Public and nonprofit providers, however, may be less motivated by profit and 
therefore less likely to take advantage of asymmetric information at patients’ expense 
even in a competitive market (Amirkhanyan, Kim, Lambright 2008; Ben-Ner, Hamann, 
and Ren 2018; Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986). In elderly healthcare, existing literature 
also shows that for-profit nursing homes provide lower quality, especially in unobserved 
dimensions of service, to gain more profit under extensive information asymmetry, while 
nonprofit nursing homes provide better quality (e.g., Ben-Ner, Karaca-Mandic, and Ren 
2012). 
Based on the discussion, I expect that public and nonprofit hospitals are more 
likely to increase service quality, whereas for-profit hospitals tend to lower the prices as 
competition increases. In a competitive market, therefore, patients in public and 
nonprofit hospitals are more likely to be satisfied with the increased quality of care than 
patients in for-profit hospitals.  
Hypothesis 4-2a. Patients are more likely to be satisfied with public hospitals 
than for-profit hospitals as market competition increases.   
Hypothesis 4-2b. Patients are more likely to be satisfied with nonprofit hospitals 





4.5. Research Context 
This study tests the role of ownership in the relationship between objective 
performance indicators and perceptual evaluations in the U.S. healthcare context. 
Frontline service providers, such as hospitals, implement federal and state programs that 
significantly affect policy outcomes and citizens’ well-being (Hicklin and Godwin 
2009). The provision of healthcare service in the United States is delivered through for-
profit, nonprofit, and government-owned facilities. Although these public, nonprofit, and 
for-profit hospitals are different in terms of legal property ownership and their main 
revenue sources (government funding vs. charitable donations vs. sale for services), their 
core service production and procedures share similarities (Johansen and Zhu 2014). In 
addition, all three types of hospitals compete with each other and face the same set of 
laws and government regulations in a fee-for-service market system.  
U.S. hospitals provide a suitable research setting for this study not only because 
of the co-existence of public, nonprofit, and for-profit providers but also because of the 
existence of standardized hospitals performance indicators that allow us to make apples 
to apples comparisons across hospitals. Since 2006, CMS initiates the VBP Program to 
produce comparable data from the patient’s perspective on the quality of care and 
archival quality indicators that allow meaningful comparisons between hospitals. Since 




indicators to financial incentives, about 98% of hospitals in the United States have begun 
reporting their performance to CMS.40  
From a theoretical standpoint, hospitals make a particularly interesting case 
because of high levels of information asymmetry that can limit consumer sovereignty 
and valid assessments of service quality. Healthcare is an infrequently used but 
important service where patients know little about service quality. Under extensive 
information asymmetry individuals tend to rely on limited sources of information. In 
hospitals, for example, patients are influenced by symbolic factors, such as 
organizational reputation and ownership status, because they are constrained by limited 
time, options, and information availability (Ben-Ner, Hamann, and Ren 2018).41 If 
individuals tend to use ownership as a signal of service quality and do not actively seek 
additional information, the ownership signal may lead them to misconstrue service 
quality provided by public providers due to its negative stereotype. In this case, even if 
public hospitals deliver high-quality care, they would get less credit for it compared to 
their for-profit counterparts.   
 
4.6. Data and Methods 
This research combines multiple databases to explore how patients perceive the 
quality of care across public, nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals. This study first uses the 
                                                 
40 For more details, see the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems website 
(http://www.hcahpsonline.org). 




2013 Hospital Compare (HC) data, which are part of the CMS hospital quality initiative. 
The data include information about the quality of care over 3,500 Medicare-certified 
hospitals across the United States in 2013. Specifically, with the Hospital Compare data, 
I focus on the VBP Program, which implements value-based purchasing to the payment 
system that accounts for the largest share of Medicare spending, affecting payment for 
inpatient stays. The Hospital VBP program utilizes the Hospital Consumer Assessment 
of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) scores to allow fair comparisons across 
hospitals. The HCAHPS survey is administered to a random sample of adult patients 
with a variety of medical conditions between 48 hours and 6 weeks after discharge 
throughout the year. HCAHPS scores are based on patient surveys, and the survey is not 
restricted to Medicare beneficiaries. CMS cleans, adjusts and analyzes the data, and then 
publishes participating hospitals’ HCAHPS results on the Hospital Compare website.42 
This study also uses the process of care measures reported under the Hospital 
Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) and Outpatient Quality Reporting (OQR) programs. 
Hospital Compare data also provide additional clinical outcomes such as unplanned 
hospital visits (unplanned 30-day readmission rates) and deaths rates (30-day mortality 
rates). CMS calculates hospital 30-day readmission and mortality rates based on 
Medicare claims, eligibility information, and VA administrative information. When 
calculating these rates, CMS adjusts for patient characteristics, such as age, gender, past 
medical history, and other diseases or conditions—that may make death or readmission 
                                                 




more likely even if a hospital provides quality care—to make fair comparisons between 
hospitals.  
 I draw hospital characteristics from the 2013 American Hospital Association 
(hereafter AHA) annual survey database. The 2013 AHA annual survey data include 
various hospital characteristics such as hospital ownership, service types, the number of 
beds, staff quality, technological support, and the percentage of Medicare and Medicaid 
spending.  
Environmental variables come from the ACS data by U.S. Census Bureau. The 
ACS data provide demographic and economic characteristics of each county, such as 
population density, unemployment rate, poverty rate. In the analysis, I use 5-year 
estimates (2009–2013) because these data cover all areas and are more precise than 1-
year estimates. 
For the model specification, this study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis. Robust standard errors are used to deal with heteroscedasticity. The 
state fixed effects control for time-invariant state-level factors that may affect patients’ 
evaluations of healthcare quality, such as differences in state regulatory administration 
or state Medicaid coverage. The unit of analysis is a hospital. 
 
4.7. Measures 
Patients’ evaluations of healthcare quality  
The dependent variable of this study is patients’ satisfaction with hospital care. A 




performance within 42 days after discharge. The 2013 HCAHPS survey includes eight 
subcategories: (1) communication with nurses, (2) communication with doctors, (3) 
responsiveness of hospital staff, (4) pain management, (5) communication about 
medicines, (6) cleanliness and quietness of hospital environment, (7) discharge 
information, and (8) overall rating of the hospital (for details, see Table A.8 in the 
Appendix).  
The Hospital VBP Program provides both raw patient satisfaction scores and 
adjusted scores based on patient characteristics, and this study uses adjusted patient 
satisfaction scores. Extensive health literature suggests that patients’ characteristics (e.g., 
gender, race, age, income, past medical history) can affect their perspectives on 
healthcare (Fan et al., 2005). Patient characteristics therefore disproportionately affect 
raw scores. Moreover, raw scores may have selection bias given that hospital section is 
not random. The hospitals located in a wealthy neighborhood, for example, tend to 
achieve better health outcomes and higher patient satisfaction due to their affluent 
patients whereas the hospitals in the deprived neighborhood are more likely to have poor 
health outcomes and lower satisfaction because of unhealthy lifestyles (Chatterjee et al. 
2012). This research therefore uses the adjusted scores to minimize potential selection-
bias and make comparisons between hospitals fair. 
Objective quality indicators and ownership 
Objective performance indicators of health care are the key independent 
variables of this study. This study uses three quality indicators: (1) clinical process of 




30-day readmission rates. These measures represent healthcare quality well because they 
cover the major procedures and outcomes of hospital care (Tsai et al. 2013). The similar 
methodology of the adjusted patient satisfaction also applies to these quality indicators. 
All three measures—process of care, outcome scores, and 30-day readmission rates—are 
risk-adjusted standardized by CMS, considering patient characteristics that can affect 
outcomes.  
The clinical process of care score represents whether a hospital provides timely 
and effective care. This domain is comprised of selected Hospital IQR program’s 
measures from acute myocardial infarction, healthcare-associated infections, heart 
failure, pneumonia, and the Surgical Care Improvement Project. The process of care 
domain has multiple subdimension indicators, such as whether patients received 
fibrinolytic therapy within 30 minutes of hospital arrival, primary percutaneous coronary 
intervention within 90 minutes of hospital arrival, discharge instructions, prophylactic 
antibiotics within one hour prior to surgical incision, and appropriate venous 
thromboembolism. 
Outcome scores represent the survival rates derived from mortality rates. 
Mortality rates are one of the most important hospital outcomes. The Hospital VBP 
Program calculates outcome scores (the survival rates) by estimating the reversed 30-day 
mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia. These 
mortality rates are also risk standardized. Because the scores come from reversed 





Thirty-day readmission rates indicate the rate of unplanned readmission to a 
hospital in the 30 days after discharge from hospitalization. Unplanned readmissions 
rates also are considered an important adverse patient outcome indicator that captures 
healthcare quality and efficiency (McIlvennan et al. 2015).43 In an effort to reduce 
readmission rates, CMS requires hospitals to report 30-day readmission rates from heart 
failure, heart attack, and pneumonia. These rates adjust for patient characteristics that 
may make returning to the hospital more likely. I calculate the average rate of these three 
indicators to create an overall 30-day readmission rate. Readmission rates are negative 
outcome measures; therefore, lower values for readmission rates indicate a higher 
quality of hospital care. 
Another key variable of this study is hospital ownership. I follow the AHA 
categorization of hospitals and code all registered hospitals into three categories: public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals. Public hospitals include facilities that are owned by 
federal, state, city, county government, or hospital district/authority. Nonprofit hospitals 
are church-operated hospitals and all other nonprofit hospitals. For-profit hospitals 
include hospital corporations, partnership hospitals, and individual-owned hospitals. The 
study sample includes 301 government-owned hospitals (12.6%), 1,536 nonprofit 
hospitals (64.2%), and 555 for-profit hospitals (23.2%). 
 
                                                 
43 Among several types of readmission rates, 30-day readmission rates are most frequently used to capture 
the quality care because readmissions after more than 30 days are more likely to be affected by other 






The models control for three sets of hospital characteristics drawing data from 
the AHA annual survey data. The first group of controls focuses on the structural 
dimension that can affect patient satisfaction. The total number of full-time employees 
(logged) is included to capture hospital size, which is one of the key structural variables. 
Hospital revenue information is also considered to capture financial structure. Revenue 
sources can explain a lot about hospital characteristics, but this information is rarely 
opened to the public. I instead use common proxy measures—the percentage of 
Medicaid days and the percentage of Medicare days—to consider a portion of Medicaid 
and Medicare reimbursement in hospital revenue (Cheon et al. 2019; Sloan and Vraciu 
1983). 
The second set of controls include hospital resources. Both human and technical 
resources can influence patients’ evaluations of hospitals and the quality of care. The 
number of employees per 10 beds (logged) as controlled to capture relative personnel 
resources. Staff quality is another important human resource factor in healthcare. I 
include the percentage of full-time registered nurses (RNs) among the total number of 
full-time employees. Having more highly qualified staff is expected to improve the 
quality of care as well as patient satisfaction. Technological support represents whether 
or not a hospital has an assistive technology center in their facility (yes = 1, no = 0).  
Third, the composition of caseloads can capture a hospital’s task characteristics. 
The models control for the percentage of acute beds linked to chronic diseases, the 




(e.g., clinical staff with technical and medical expertise) and thereby increases task 
difficulty of a hospital. The percentage of acute beds is expected to be significantly 
associated with patient satisfaction. Lastly, I include a dummy variable for rural 
hospitals to control for a hospital’s location (yes = 1, no = 0). 
County-level controls 
 The citizen satisfaction literature suggests that citizens’ evaluations of service 
quality can be influenced by jurisdiction-level factors and individual-level factors 
(Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 1992). To consider the role of neighborhood 
characteristics, I control for demographic and economic environment factors. First, the 
healthcare market structure can affect hospitals’ strategies (Johansen and Zhu 2014; 
Maynard 1991) and influence patients’ evaluations of hospitals. The models control for 
market competition measured by using two important factors in the healthcare market—
the concentration of healthcare providers and the degree of specialization in a local 
health market (Robinson 2011).  
First, public, nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals in the U.S. healthcare market 
compete for clients and ceteris paribus “market competition is high in an area with a 
higher concentration of hospitals and less in an area with a lower concentration of 
hospitals” (Johansen and Zhu 2014, 168). Second, hospitals target different clients based 
on their specialized services; for example, children’s hospitals attract children whereas 
general hospitals attract adults. Even in a high concentration area, a few specialized 
hospitals can enjoy the monopoly status regarding a particular service. Considering these 




service area, which is identified by the AHA (Johansen and Zhu 2014). Low values 
indicate low competition at the particular service type in a local market and high values 
represent high competition in that local area.  
Population density is a crucial predictor of healthcare quality, and all models 
include logged population density. Local economic conditions are also considered in the 
analysis. Specifically, I control for poverty rate, unemployment rate, and population with 
no health insurance at the county level. Based on the previous literature suggesting that 
citizens in a low-income area are less likely to be satisfied with service quality, I expect 
that these variables would be negatively associated with patient satisfaction. Descriptive 
statistics of all variables are shown in Table A.9 in the Appendix.     
 
4.8. Findings 
Before conducting a series of regression models, I analyze the correlation among 
patient satisfaction, objective performance measures, and hospital ownership. Table 4.1 
shows that patient satisfaction is moderately correlated with the clinical process score (r 
= 0.11, p < 0.000), the outcome score (r = –0.10, p < 0.000), and the 30-day readmission 
rate (r = –0.14, p < 0.000). While public and nonprofit ownership positively correlates 
















Patient satisfaction 1    
Clinical process 0.113* 1   
Outcome score –0.104* 0.045* 1  
30-day readmission rates –0.144* –0.017 0.031 1 
Public hospital 0.078* –0.134* –0.061* 0.026 
Nonprofit hospital 0.089* –0.034 0.092* –0.090* 
For-profit hospital –0.169* 0.151* –0.057* 0.083* 
Note. * p < 0.05     
 
Table 4.2 shows the linear model estimates for the association between objective 
hospital performance indicators and patients’ perceptual evaluations of healthcare. 
Despite the common beliefs that for-profit providers outperform public or nonprofit 
providers, results from U.S. hospitals show the opposite picture. Both public and 
nonprofit ownerships are statistically significant and positively associated with patient 
satisfaction. Moreover, the unstandardized coefficients of public and nonprofit hospitals 
are quite large given the range of patient satisfaction (between 3 and 99). On average, 
public and nonprofit hospitals achieve 7~9-point higher scores than their for-profit 
counterparts, holding other variables constant. This finding suggests that patients in 
public and nonprofit hospitals are more likely to be satisfied with the quality of care than 
patients in for-profit hospitals, all other things being equal.   
The relationships between objective quality measures and patient satisfaction are 
consistent with earlier research. Both clinical process and 30-day readmission 




resources and constraints as well as environmental factors. The inclusion of these 
controls supports the conclusion that objective quality indicators and patients’ perceptual 
evaluations have some degree of convergent validity in U.S. hospitals. Outcomes scores, 
however, are not statistically significantly related to patient satisfaction. Detailed 
discussion on this finding will be presented in a later section. 
Among the hospital characteristics, hospital size measured with a total number of 
employees shows a negative and significant coefficient suggesting that patients are less 
likely to be satisfied with large hospitals than small hospitals. Having more human 
resources positively associates with higher patient satisfaction as expected. Medicaid 
discharges negatively relate to patient satisfaction. Patients in rural hospitals are happier 
with the care quality than patients in urban areas, which is not in the predicted direction. 
 Among environmental factors, unemployment rates explain the most patient 
satisfaction. Patients are significantly less satisfied with healthcare quality in an area 
with higher unemployment rates. Possible explanations about this result is either a halo 
effect or poor people without Medicaid get worse treatment. This finding is especially 
interesting given that the models already control for poverty rates and lack of health 




Table 4.2. Objective and Subjective Performance Assessment 
Dependent variable = Patient satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public hospital 8.969*** 7.928*** 7.850*** 
 (1.487) (1.472) (1.475) 
Nonprofit hospital 8.540*** 7.948*** 7.786*** 
 (1.126) (1.128) (1.131) 
Clinical process 0.121***   
 (0.021)   
Outcome score  0.004  
  (0.018)  
30–day readmission rates    –0.638* 
   (0.314) 
Total employees  –3.403*** –3.585*** –3.825*** 
 (1.029) (1.066) (1.071) 
Total employees per 10 beds  7.922*** 8.085*** 8.210*** 
 (1.242) (1.254) (1.257) 
Medicaid discharges –2.436*** –2.518*** –2.346*** 
 (0.643) (0.650) (0.655) 
Medicare discharges 0.671 0.776 0.649 
 (0.728) (0.760) (0.759) 
Fulltime RNs 0.029 0.047 0.044 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
Technical support  –0.876 –0.835 –0.872 
 (0.820) (0.837) (0.838) 
Acute beds –0.119 –0.176 –0.170 
 (0.121) (0.111) (0.114) 
Rural hospitals  4.342*** 4.403*** 4.380*** 
 (1.151) (1.171) (1.169) 
Market competition –0.088 –0.083 –0.078 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Population density –0.333 –0.165 –0.068 
 (0.347) (0.351) (0.352) 
Poverty rate 0.168+ 0.126 0.141 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) 
Unemployed rate –0.893* –0.942* –0.896* 
 (0.372) (0.374) (0.373) 
No health insurance –0.212+ –0.178 –0.179 
 (0.125) (0.129) (0.129) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.302 0.289 0.290 
N 1,925 1,925 1,924 
Note. The reference group for public and nonprofit hospitals is for-profit hospitals. Robust standard 




The key interest of this study is whether ownership status shapes the relationship 
between objective quality indicators and patient satisfaction. To test the hypotheses, 
Table 4.3 includes the interaction terms between each of objective performance 
measures and public/nonprofit dummies. A reference group here is for-profits. Model (1) 
in Table 4.3 shows the interactions between the clinical process and ownership of public 
and nonprofit are not statistically significant. This result suggests there are no systematic 
sector differences in patients’ evaluations for equivalent care quality.  
Turning to Models (2) and (3), I find evidence that ownership moderates the 
relationship between outcome scores and patient satisfaction. The interaction between 
public hospitals and outcome scores in Model (2) are negative and significant, 
suggesting that public ownership decreases the positive effect of outcome scores on 
patient satisfaction. The marginal effect of outcome scores in public hospitals is –0.095 
whereas the marginal effect in for-profit hospitals is 0.063, all other things being equal. 
This result is simply that public hospitals get rated lower as their performance goes up, 
while for-profit hospitals get rated higher as their performance goes up. This means that 
for-profit hospitals receive much more credit for good outcomes than public hospitals. 
Figure 4.1 presents predicted patient satisfaction in public and for-profit hospitals 
varying levels of outcome scores (Model (2) in Table 4.3). The solid line illustrates the 
relationship for public hospitals and the dashed line shows the relationship for for-profit 
hospitals. The slope of the dashed line is positive, suggesting that outcome scores have a 
positive effect on patient satisfaction in for-profit hospitals. The slope of the solid line is 




In Model (3) in Table 4.3, the key variable is 30-day readmission rates, which are 
reversed outcomes; therefore, strong and negative relationship is a good thing. The 
interaction between nonprofit and 30-day readmission rates is positive and significant 
(with a significance level of 0.1), suggesting that nonprofit ownership decreases the 
effect of 30-day readmission rates on patient satisfaction. The marginal effect of 30-day 
readmission rates in nonprofit hospitals is –0.408, while it is –1.758 in for-profit 
hospitals. Because the negative relationship is a good thing, one can interpret this result 
as for-profit hospitals receive more credit than nonprofit hospitals for lower readmission 
rates. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the predicted effects of 30-day readmission rates on patient 
satisfaction (Model (3) in Table 4.3). Again, the 30-day readmission rate is a reverse 
outcome, and low values represent good performance. Here, the solid line represents 
nonprofit hospitals, and the dashed line indicates for-profit hospitals. Both slops are 
negative, suggesting that patients are more satisfied with hospitals as 30-day readmission 
rates decrease. The slope for for-profit hospitals is much steeper than nonprofit hospitals, 
indicating that 30-day readmission rates and patient satisfaction are more closely aligned 






Table 4.3. The Role of Ownership in the Relationship Between Objective and 
Subjective Assessment 
Dependent variable = Patient satisfaction  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public hospital 7.926+ 12.333*** –16.557 
 (4.562) (2.547) (20.090) 
Nonprofit hospital 5.892 9.533*** –19.204 
 (3.723) (1.865) (14.983) 
Clinical process 0.091+   
 (0.048)   
Public hospital × Clinical process 0.013   
 (0.073)   
Nonprofit hospital × Clinical process 0.042   
 (0.054)   
Outcome score  0.063  
  (0.049)  
Public hospital × Outcome score  –0.158*  
  (0.076)  
Nonprofit hospital × Outcome score  –0.057  
  (0.052)  
30–day readmission rates    –1.758** 
   (0.669) 
Public hospital × 30-day readmission 
rates  
  1.216 
   (1.003) 
Nonprofit hospital × 30-day readmission 
rates  
  1.350+ 
   (0.744) 
Total employees  –3.390** –3.649*** –3.837*** 
 (1.031) (1.062) (1.081) 
Total employees per 10 beds  7.927*** 8.083*** 8.251*** 
 (1.242) (1.241) (1.265) 
Medicaid discharges –2.449*** –2.448*** –2.318*** 
 (0.644) (0.649) (0.655) 
Medicare discharges 0.706 0.779 0.620 
 (0.730) (0.748) (0.762) 
Fulltime RNs 0.030 0.041 0.042 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
Technical support  –0.905 –0.880 –0.886 
 (0.820) (0.838) (0.839) 
Acute beds –0.115 –0.177 –0.173 
 (0.123) (0.112) (0.112) 
    




Table 4.3. Continued    
Dependent variable = Patient satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rural hospitals  4.315*** 4.333*** 4.306*** 
 (1.149) (1.170) (1.171) 
Market competition –0.087 –0.076 –0.076 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) 
Population density –0.360 –0.160 –0.107 
 (0.348) (0.351) (0.352) 
Poverty rate 0.165+ 0.121 0.137 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) 
Unemployed rate –0.892* –0.957* –0.853* 
 (0.373) (0.374) (0.375) 
No health insurance –0.207 –0.186 –0.189 
 (0.127) (0.130) (0.129) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.302 0.290 0.291 
N 1,925 1,925 1,924 
Note. The reference group for public and nonprofit hospitals is for-profit hospitals. Robust standard 









Figure 4.1. Predicted Effects of Outcome Scores in Public and For-profit Hospitals 
 
 






To test how market competition influences patients’ evaluations of public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals, Table 4.4 includes the interactions between ownership 
and market competition. While the interaction between the public sector and market 
competition is not statistically significant, the interaction between the nonprofit sector 
and market competition is consistently positive and significant across all models. In 
Model (1), for example, the marginal effect of market competition on patient satisfaction 
is –0.357 in the for-profit sector, while it is 0.018 in the nonprofit sector. This finding 
suggests market competition has a negative impact in the for-profit sector and is almost 
zero in the nonprofit sector. 
The finding on the effect of market competition on patients’ evaluations of 
hospitals implies that market competition may also play a role in shaping the interactive 
relationship between objective quality indicators and ownership on patient satisfaction. 
To test this hypothesis, I present additional models that include three-way interactions 
between ownership, market competition, and one for each of the quality variables. 





Table 4.4. Market Competition and Subjective Assessment of Service Quality 
Dependent variable = Patient satisfaction  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public hospital 7.184* 6.034+ 6.147+ 
 (3.632) (3.646) (3.634) 
Nonprofit hospital 3.339 2.543 2.557 
 (2.983) (3.019) (3.020) 
Market competition –0.357+ –0.363* –0.348+ 
 (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) 
Public hospital × Market competition 0.123 0.131 0.117 
 (0.240) (0.243) (0.242) 
Nonprofit hospital × Market competition 0.375* 0.390* 0.378* 
 (0.189) (0.192) (0.192) 
Clinical process 0.120***   
 (0.021)   
Outcome score  0.004  
  (0.018)  
30-day readmission rates    –0.617+ 
   (0.315) 
Total employees  –3.397*** –3.576*** –3.808*** 
 (1.021) (1.058) (1.063) 
Total employees per 10 beds  7.814*** 7.972*** 8.097*** 
 (1.226) (1.238) (1.241) 
Medicaid discharges –2.410*** –2.492*** –2.326*** 
 (0.636) (0.643) (0.648) 
Medicare discharges 0.678 0.784 0.659 
 (0.723) (0.756) (0.756) 
Fulltime RNs 0.029 0.047 0.044 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) 
Technical support –0.883 –0.843 –0.878 
 (0.820) (0.837) (0.838) 
Acute beds –0.124 –0.180 –0.174 
 (0.122) (0.112) (0.115) 
Rural hospitals  4.450*** 4.513*** 4.491*** 
 (1.150) (1.169) (1.167) 
Population density –0.310 –0.141 –0.049 
 (0.348) (0.352) (0.353) 
    




Table 4.4. Continued    
Dependent variable = Patient satisfaction    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Poverty rate 0.162+ 0.121 0.135 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) 
Unemployed rate –0.916* –0.966** –0.921* 
 (0.372) (0.373) (0.373) 
No health insurance –0.211+ –0.177 –0.177 
 (0.126) (0.130) (0.130) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304 0.290 0.292 
N 1,925 1,925 1,924 
Note. The reference group for public and nonprofit hospitals is for-profit hospitals. Robust standard 
errors shown in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 4.5 presents abbreviated information from three additional regressions, 
each representing the model including a three-way interaction among ownership, market 
competition, and a quality indicator. A significant interaction among these three 
variables indicates that the interactive effect of ownership and the service quality on 
patient satisfaction is moderated by market competition. The three-way interaction term 
in Model (1) in Table 4.5 is indeed statistically significant and positive, suggesting the 
association between the public ownership and process of care scores can be enhanced as 





Table 4.5. Market Competition, Objective Performance Indicators, and Ownership  
Dependent variable = Patient satisfaction    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public hospital 25.514* 11.735+ –55.150 
 (10.500) (6.626) (52.651) 
Nonprofit hospital 2.948 8.944 –65.579 
 (8.873) (5.448) (41.464) 
Market competition 0.138 0.008 –2.762 
 (0.496) (0.325) (2.235) 
Public hospital × Market competition –1.351+ 0.014 2.697 
 (0.695) (0.452) (3.202) 
Nonprofit hospital × Market competition 0.191 0.018 3.532 
 (0.570) (0.354) (2.486) 
Clinical process 0.201+   
 (0.119)   
Public hospital × Clinical process –0.343+   
 (0.177)   
Nonprofit hospital × Clinical process 0.005   
 (0.137)   
Market competition × Clinical process –0.008   
 (0.008)   
Public hospital × Market competition × 
Clinical process 
0.027*   
 (0.012)   
Nonprofit hospital × Market competition 
× Clinical process 
0.003   
 (0.009)   
Outcome scores  0.227  
  (0.159)  
Public hospital × Outcome scores  –0.218  
  (0.199)  
Nonprofit hospital × Outcome scores  –0.221  
  (0.166)  
Market competition × Outcome scores  –0.013  
  (0.011)  
Public hospital × Market competition × 
Outcome scores 
 0.006  
  (0.013)  
Nonprofit hospital × Market competition 
× Outcome scores 
 0.013  
  (0.011)  
    




Table 4.5. Continued    
Dependent variable = Patient satisfaction    
 (1) (2) (3) 
30-day readmission rates    –3.380+ 
   (1.873) 
Public hospital × 30-day readmission 
rates  
  3.099 
   (2.608) 
Nonprofit hospital × 30-day readmission 
rates  
  3.445+ 
   (2.047) 
Market competition × 30-day 
readmission rates  
  0.123 
   (0.109) 
Public hospital × Market competition × 
30-day readmission rates  
  –0.131 
   (0.155) 
Nonprofit hospital × Market competition 
× 30-day readmission rates  
  –0.160 
   (0.122) 
    
Control included Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304 0.291 0.291 
N 1,925 1,925 1,924 
Note. The reference group for public and nonprofit hospitals is for-profit hospitals. Robust standard errors 
shown in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
To more intuitively interpret the three-way interaction, I plot the predicted 
relationship between patient satisfaction and process scores for public and for-profit 
hospitals at different levels of market competition (Model (1) in Table 4.5). Figure 4.3 
presents the predicted plot of patient satisfaction is depicted for the average value of 
process scores with a full range of market competition. When market competition is low 
and the process score is average, predicted patient satisfaction is higher in for-profit 
hospitals than in public hospitals (holding all other factors constant). When market 




satisfaction is higher in public hospitals than in for-profit hospitals. In sum, the findings 
partially support the role of market competition in shaping the relationship between 
objective performance and ownership. 
 
Figure 4.3. The Predicted Marginal Effects of Process Scores on Patient 
Satisfaction for Public and For-profit Hospitals 
 
 
4.9. Discussion and Conclusion 
“From birth to death, the idea that public sector organizations are inefficient, 
wasteful, and inferior to private sector organizations is consistently drilled into 
Americans’ heads” (Marvel 2016, 143). This anti-public sector bias is important because 
it directly affects citizens’ support for the government as well as their choices between 
public and private in the service provision. This essay contributes to our understanding 




information and citizens’ evaluations of service and what role market competition plays 
in shaping citizen satisfaction in the service delivery process.  
Evidence from U.S. hospitals reveals that patients’ perceptual evaluations of 
healthcare quality are significantly associated with objective hospital performance 
indicators, but the extent to which these two measures are correlated varies across 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals. Objective outcome indicators are more closely 
aligned with patient satisfaction in for-profit hospitals than in either public or nonprofit 
hospitals, suggesting public and nonprofit hospitals get less credit for quality care 
compared with their for-profit counterparts. This finding also implies the negative 
stereotype of the public sector not only shapes citizens’ perception of performance itself 
(Goodsell 2004; Hvidman 2018) but also weakens the effect of objective performance 
indicators on citizen satisfaction.  
While two outcome dimensions (outcome scores and 30-day readmission rates) 
support the sector bias in patients’ evaluations, there are no significant sector differences 
in patients’ evaluations of the clinical process. One possible explanation is that the sector 
bias may be more conspicuous when there are bad outcomes. The literature on citizens’ 
attributions of blame suggests that public agencies are easy targets when things go 
wrong (James et al. 2016; Marvel and Girth 2016). Given that both outcome scores and 
30-day readmission rates are calculated based on undesirable outcomes—such as deaths 
and unplanned hospital revisits due to complications—patients might blame public 
hospitals more than for-profit hospitals for such outcomes. In a similar vein, negativity 




mechanism (Boyne et al. 2009; James and Moseley 2014). The poor outcome may 
become more evident in a public hospital than in a for-profit hospital because 
information about bad outcomes can trigger the negative stereotype of the public sector.  
The sector bias, however, tends to fade away as market competition increases. 
This study finds that patients are more likely to be satisfied with nonprofit than for-profit 
hospitals in a competitive market, and public hospitals get more credit for quality 
healthcare as competition increases. These outcomes might result from the heterogeneity 
in strategies to deal with market constraints across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
hospitals (Johansen and Zhu 2014).  
The previous literature implies that public and nonprofit hospitals tend to pursue 
service quality, whereas for-profit providers tend to care more about service costs as 
competition increases (Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2008), and these different 
strategies may lead to different levels of patient satisfaction. Additional regression 
analyses support this mechanism (Table A.10 in the Appendix), showing that public 
hospitals are more likely to achieve higher outcome scores than for-profit hospitals, and 
nonprofit hospitals tend to outperform their for-profit counterparts in terms of 30-day 
readmission rates as market competition increases (interaction terms are significant with 
a significance level of 0.1). 
It is important to discuss the limitations of the current study and the directions for 
future research. First, although this research uses responses from real patients with 
recent experiences that contribute to external validity, the analysis is conducted at the 




individual-level data will benefit future research and allow for a better understanding of 
how individual citizens evaluate service quality based on objective performance 
indicators and the provider’s ownership status.  
Second, this paper focuses on healthcare, where information asymmetry can limit 
citizens’ ability to make accurate judgments on quality, and whether the findings are 
generalizable in policy areas with less information asymmetry is an open question. The 
generalizability issue is particularly worth highlighting in the public sector bias research 
because policy context can play a significant role in shaping citizens’ sector preferences. 
Studies from different policy areas often produce contrasting results (e.g., military 
service vs. package delivery).  
This difference may come from the degree of coerciveness of policy, “the extent 
to which a tool restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to merely encouraging 
or discouraging it” (Salamon 2002b, 25). Citizens may prefer the public sector over the 
private sector in highly coercive policy fields, such as law enforcement and probation 
(authority-oriented policies), whereas they tend to choose private over public in 
minimally coercive policy areas, such as package delivery and street cleanliness 
(service-oriented policies). Future research should explore the policy contexts in which 
citizens show more or less anti-public bias.   
How public and private ownership affect citizens’ evaluations of service 
performance has been a core question in public administration because it relates to the 
fundamental question of who should deliver public services (Hvidman 2018; Wilson 




in shaping citizens’ opinions about service quality and the way they interpret objective 
performance data. Further, this research highlights the role of market structure in 
shaping citizens’ evaluations of service quality by showing that anti-public bias 





Understanding how public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations can contribute 
to successful public service provision has been and will continue to be a key question in 
public administration research and practice. Drawing from public administration and 
political science theories, this dissertation expands theoretical perspectives on public 
service provision through public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations and provides 
practical implications for successful program outcomes. In sum, the findings from all 
three essays consistently support the notion that publicness matters in the public service 
process. The first essay shows that public and nonprofit organizations tend to comply 
with regulation and improve service quality, while for-profits decrease these facing 
increased competition in a fee-for-service market system. The second essay suggests that 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit managers tend to focus on different management 
strategies, and these managerial efforts have different effects on service performance 
across sectors. The third essay finds that public and nonprofit organizations tend to 
receive less credit than for-profit organizations for equivalent service quality; but this 
sector bias tends to fade away as market competition increases.  
 
5.1. Implications for Theory  
This dissertation provides important theoretical implications for our 
understanding of how and when organizational publicness matters in the public service 




organizations. Classical theoretical works have highlighted the distinction between 
political and market constraints, particularly when defining public and private 
organizations (e.g., Bozeman 1987; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Wamsely and Zald 1973). 
The traditional publicness theory suggests governmental organizations are more likely to 
respond to political forces rather than market forces. Alongside this theoretical 
expectation, it is often assumed that public agencies do not compete with others in a 
service market, therefore, private organizations can be more effective than public ones 
due to the benefits of market competition.  
This dissertation challenges this conventional wisdom and contributes to the 
public administration theory. More specifically, based on the literature suggesting that 
governmental organizations also frequently face market forces and respond to increased 
competition (e.g., Johansen and Zhu 2014), this research provides a theoretical 
framework for different motivations for regulatory compliance across public, nonprofit, 
and for-profit organizations under increased competition. The empirical evidence from 
U.S. healthcare contrasts with the conventional wisdom that market competition works 
better in the private sector. Specifically, the findings suggest that increased competition 
negatively affects the private sector, while a well-functioning market mechanism 
benefits service delivery in the public and nonprofit sectors.  
The second theoretical contribution of this dissertation is combining classic 
management theories and public–private distinction literature to investigate how the 
effect of management on performance varies across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 




research also considers both quantity and quality aspects of management to provide a 
multidimensional view of the relationship between management and performance. This 
comprehensive approach contributes to the public management literature by helping us 
to gain a better understanding of what managers do to improve service performance and 
in which type of organization their management actions can be more effective. 
Furthermore, this study takes structure into account when explaining the 
heterogeneous effects of management practices on performance. For example, empirical 
evidence suggests the effect of buffering strategies can be contingent on stability, 
particularly in the public sector. This finding provides a theoretical implication for the 
potential bifunctional model of management and structure in promoting program 
performance.   
Third, performance assessment has been a critical topic in the public–private 
distinction research, not only because ownership itself has an impact on performance but 
also because there are fundamental differences in the ways that performance is evaluated 
by stakeholders. This dissertation focuses on performance assessment in the eyes of 
citizens and contributes to the literature on government performance by considering both 
archival performance information and perceptual sector bias. Particularly, this research 
investigates whether citizens judge equivalent performance information more negatively 
for public agencies compared to for-profit firms, not simply whether citizens have 
favorable views on the private sector over the public sector.  
Another important theoretical contribution of this project is to highlight the role 




market competition into the discussion. There has been a need to consider jurisdiction-
level factors (e.g., community-level poverty, service market structure) to explain citizen 
satisfaction (Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 1992) because previous literature has mainly 
focused on individual-level factors (e.g., socioeconomic status, individual expectations 
or experiences). This study speaks to citizen satisfaction literature by suggesting that 
citizens’ satisfaction with public programs can be explained by institutional factors in 
addition to individual-level factors.   
 
5.2. Implications for Practice 
This dissertation also provides practical implications for effective service 
delivery generally and quality healthcare specifically. First, the side effects of market 
competition in the private sector and their implications are worth discussing from a 
policy implication perspective, given that healthcare provision in the United States is 
primarily dominated by the private sector. The findings fundamentally challenge the 
notion of new public management that encourages public organizations to adopt the 
private model of management. The findings also raise the important question of how we 
should manage private facilities under increased market competition. Privatization might 
not be the best solution in the context of healthcare. Opening more public hospitals may 
not be a feasible option either because it would cost much taxpayer money.  
One possible solution is establishing an effective oversight and monitoring 
system to prevent for-profits from taking advantage of the information asymmetry under 




incentives or rewards) and sticks (fines or penalties) or a mix of these two types of 
policy tools to ensure quality healthcare. Providing quality information to clients can 
help reduce information asymmetry and prevent for-profits from lowering the quality of 
care. These efforts can maximize the benefits of market competition in healthcare. 
Moreover, it is worth highlighting that the benefits of market competition in the public 
and nonprofit sectors appear in both the hospital and the nursing home contexts. This 
positive effect of market competition implies we may need to increase competition for 
the public and nonprofit sectors. 
Second, the findings on the relationship between management and performance 
also suggest meaningful implications for public and nonprofit managers. Volumes of 
research exist on the effect of public management on public service performance, 
showing that public managers who effectively manage personnel and deal with 
environmental challenges can make a difference in program performance (e.g., 
Akkerman and Torenvlied 2011; Favero, Meier, and O’Toole 2016; Goerdel 2006; 
O’Toole and Meier 2009, 2011). Going further than this general knowledge, this project 
shows effective management strategies can vary across public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations, implying that a one-size-fits-all approach may not be the best.  
This research also suggests specific conditions that can enhance the effect of 
managers’ efforts on performance, especially in the public sector. Public managers’ 
efforts to buffer external turbulence, for example, may be maximized when they interact 
with the right actors (e.g., political principals) and when there is greater stability. These 




establish a buffering structure that can enhance their efforts to improve program 
performance.       
Third, the results on the sector bias in citizens’ evaluation of performance 
suggests that public and nonprofit organizations should communicate more about their 
performance with citizens and also try to improve their images and reputations. Effective 
communication on performance can serve as the primary tool for reducing sector bias 
and further promoting accountability. Performance reporting through a reliable 
communications system can be critical. It is also important to make performance 
information easily accessible to citizens and to make the information credible. 
Promoting agency reputation can be another way to reduce anti-public bias. 
Recent studies show that some public agencies have images that evoke positive emotions 
among citizens based on “citizen-based brand equity” (Teodoro and An 2018, 321). 
Such efforts could increase citizens’ awareness of service quality and improve their 
perceptions of performance in both the public and nonprofit sectors.   
 
5.3. Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
A few limitations in this research and the directions for future research should be 
addressed. First, although legal ownership, funding source, and social control are 
important elements in defining publicness (Bozeman 1987; Perry and Rainey 1988; 
Wamsley and Zald 1973), this dissertation focuses on ownership following the core 
dimension approach. Measuring each dimension of publicness and testing its impact on 




three dimensions of publicness are not mutually exclusive but rather overlap (Meier and 
O’Toole 2011).44 Measuring social control, for example, is particularly a challenging 
task because (1) it is difficult to observe political control, whereas ownership and 
funding are relatively observable, and (2) often there is little variation in political control 
in a single country or the same service area. 
Despite these difficulties, it is worth studying whether each dimension of 
publicness means something different and whether they have different impacts on 
service performance. For example, in U.S. healthcare—the research context of this 
dissertation—one way to measure social control is to use state-level variation in the 
policy implementation process. Although federal regulations apply to all hospitals, 
specific implementation processes may vary across states and this variation will allow us 
to see how organizations respond to the different levels of social control (see also Miller 
and Moulton 2013).  
Another interesting topic for future research would be exploring the functional 
form of publicness. Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011), for instance, suggest that the 
effect of ownership and funding on performance can be moderated by social control. 
Further analysis can benefit the publicness discussion by showing whether and how each 
dimension of publicness interacts with the others and affects performance.  
                                                 
44 Social control especially has received little attention due to its measurement difficulties. After reviewing 
more than 100 articles about publicness and performance, Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) report that 




 Second, although this project recognizes the importance of the multi-dimensional 
nature of public service performance, empirical analyses focus on overall performance 
or the quality aspect of performance. Public organizations have multiple performance 
criteria that come from multiple stakeholders with heterogeneous preferences (Andersen, 
Boesen, and Pedersen 2016; Boyne 2003b; Walker, Boyne, and Brewer 2010). This 
unique characteristic makes public agencies care more about equity, fairness, and 
accountability in addition to efficiency (Rainey 2009; Wilson 1987), while for-profit 
organizations tend to focus on efficiency.  
Particularly, systematic research is in need of information about how public, 
nonprofit, and for-profit organizations promote equity in the public service provision. It 
is an important question because existing work suggests publicness may have different 
influences on efficiency and equity, respectively (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2011), 
and citizens tend to perceive public organizations as more equitable than private 
organizations (Hvidman 2018). In healthcare, are public and nonprofit facilities more 
effective in reducing healthcare access and outcome disparities than their for-profit 
counterparts under a competitive market? What management strategies are more likely 
to lead to more equitable and affordable access to healthcare public, nonprofit, and for-
profit facilities? Do citizens give more positive feedback to public organizations when 
they promote equity rather than efficiency? Answering these questions will make a 
meaningful contribution to theory and practice.   
 Third, generalizability is another important direction for future research. All of 




motivated by theoretical reasoning that is not limited to this particular context. The U.S. 
healthcare context provides a great research ground for testing theoretical arguments 
about publicness, environment, management, and performance. Whether the findings in 
U.S. healthcare are generalizable to other contexts, however, is an open question.  
More specifically, it is crucial to test these theoretical arguments in other policy 
settings, such as education or law enforcement. Considering different policy contexts 
contributes to public administration theory by allowing us to take into account various 
service characteristics such as the levels of information asymmetry, the levels of 
professionalism, or the range of impact on individuals. These various service 
characteristics across policy areas may help us to understand heterogeneity in 
organizations’ responding to market constraints, managing operations, and improving 
performance. Future research in other policy settings, therefore, will yield new insights 
that might be missed if only hospitals and nursing homes were examined.  
Related to the generalizability issue, another important direction would be to 
apply the theory to a different national context. While all three essays are conducted in 
the U.S. context, the discussion on the public–private distinction is also a highly salient 
issue in many other countries. The cross-national analysis would be a particularly 
meaningful effort for healthcare since the role of the market versus government in 
delivering healthcare significantly varies across countries.  
Historically, more centralized and nonmarket means have been frequently used in 
most countries outside of the United States, while private markets have long played a 




Propper 2013). In the example of healthcare expenditures, while the United States had 
public sector spending similar to that of other comparable countries in 2016, its private 
sector spending was almost triple that of comparable countries (see Figure 5.1). In 2016, 
public sector spending comprised 8.5% of the GDP in the United States and 7.9% of the 
GDP in comparable countries, on average. Private sector spending in the United States 
was 8.8%, while the comparable country average is 2.7% (Sawyer and Cox 2018). 
 
Figure 5.1. Total Health Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP by Public vs. Private 
Spending: 2016
 
Source. Adapted from “How does health spending in the U.S. compare to other countries?” by Sawyer and 
Cox (2018), Peterson-Kaiser Health System Tracker.  
Note. Comparable countries in this analysis include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, 





































In addition to the relatively large portion of the private sector spending in the 
United States, Figure 5.2 shows that private expenditures in the United States have 
grown significantly over the last few decades, while the increases in private expenditures 
in other countries have been minimal. These differences highlight the importance of 
understanding the national context in discussing the roles of market and government in 
delivering healthcare services.  
 
Figure 5.2. Total Health Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP: 1970–2016
 
Source. Adapted from “How does health spending in the U.S. compare to other countries?” by Sawyer and 
Cox (2018), Peterson-Kaiser Health System Tracker.  
Note. Comparable countries in this analysis include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, 
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In addition to different levels of public versus private expenditures, the capacity 
of clients to vote across countries creates systematically different levels of market 
competition. Patients in the U.S. system, for example, have selective access to healthcare 
based on their insurance coverage. In many other countries, such as Canada, Germany, 
or South Korea, patients have universal access to healthcare based on a national 
insurance system. The different access levels can make a significant difference in market 
competition because universal access allows patients to go to any health agencies they 
want. While the evidence from U.S. elderly healthcare suggests that market competition 
can have a side effect in the for-profit sector, evidence from U.K. hospitals suggests that 
introducing more competition saves more lives without increasing costs (see Gaynor, 
Moreno-Serra, and Propper 2013). These contrasting findings suggest that we should 
take national context more seriously.  
The value of the cross-national approach is not limited to the role of market 
competition or the field of healthcare. More generally, this approach allows us to 
consider the different levels of political control and citizens’ perceptions of the service 
provisions of public and private organizations. While most countries have a control 
mechanism over service providers through regulations or oversight, the degree of control 
may substantially vary. Different levels of political control over service providers across 
countries allow us to consider the effect of political controls on successful service 
delivery.  
Furthermore, citizens’ perceptions of public service provision also can be varied 




good and believe that it should be delivered by public agencies, while citizens in other 
countries consider it as a private good and prefer a market mechanism. A cross-national 
analysis that incorporates various countries with different institutional contexts will 
make a theoretical contribution to the literature. 
To conclude, the publicness puzzle is not yet completely solved. There are no 
easy answers for maximizing performance under competition, finding the best 
management strategies, and improving citizens’ perceptions of public sector 
performance. Still, the theoretical frameworks and empirical analyses contained in this 
dissertation help us to gain useful knowledge about how public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
institutions operate, manage resources, and make decisions that improve performance. 
This project also provides meaningful implications for successful public service 
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Figure A.2. Health Deficiencies Across Public, Nonprofit, and For-profit Nursing 











Figure A.4. Quality Rating Across Public, Nonprofit, and For-profit Nursing 



















Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables: Chapter 2 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Source 
Dependent variable       
Total number of health deficiencies 6.95 6.07 0 86 NHC 
Overall 5-star rating 3.29 1.36 1 5 NHC 
Independent variable       
Public home (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.06 - 0 1 NHC 
Nonprofit home (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.24 - 0 1 NHC 
For-profit home (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.70 - 0 1 NHC 
Lagged market competition  0.79 0.25 0 1.00 NHC 
Facility-level controls      
Number of federally certified beds  107.27 61.65 3 1389 NHC 
Number of residents in certified beds  88.45 54.77 2 955 NHC 
Staffing hours per resident per day  4.13 1.04 1.51 51.26 NHC 
Years since Medicare/Medicaid certified     26.61 11.63 1 50 NHC 
Changed ownership in last 12 months 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
0.03 - 0 1 NHC 
Certification: Medicare and Medicaid 0.93 - 0 1 NHC 
Certification: Medicare only  0.04 - 0 1 NHC 
Certification: Medicaid only  0.03 - 0 1 NHC 
Hospital affiliated home (yes = 1; no = 
0) 
0.05 - 0 1 NHC 
County-level controls       
Population density per sq. mile (in 
1,000s) 
1.28 4.08 0.00 72.17 ACS 
Elderly population (%) 15.24 3.87 5.76 53.1 ACS 
White population (%) 78.19 16.34 11.05 100 ACS 
Population without health insurance (%) 12.60 5.06 2.15 45.71 ACS 
Unemployed population (%) 5.16 1.61 0 17.02 ACS 
Poverty population (%) 14.63 5.23 2.64 48.98 ACS 
Gini index of income inequality 0.45 0.03 0.32 0.65 ACS 





Table A.2. Divergence in Regulatory Compliance Under Market Competition: 
Lagged DV model 
Dependent variable = The number of health deficiencies 
 Coef. Robust SE 
Public home 0.051 (0.038) 
Nonprofit home –0.015 (0.034) 
Lagged market competition 0.109*** (0.030) 
Public home × Lagged market competition –0.171*** (0.050) 
Nonprofit home × Lagged market competition –0.156*** (0.041) 
Lagged number of health deficiencies  0.052*** (0.001) 
Number of certified beds  0.002*** (0.000) 
Number of residents  –0.001*** (0.000) 
Staffing hours  –0.079*** (0.007) 
Years since certification  0.001+ (0.000) 
Changed ownership 0.093*** (0.021) 
Certification: Medicare only –0.196*** (0.025) 
Certification: Medicaid only –0.071** (0.025) 
Hospital affiliated home  –0.004 (0.021) 
Population density  –0.026*** (0.004) 
Elderly population  –0.005** (0.002) 
White population  –0.001+ (0.001) 
Population without health insurance –0.001 (0.003) 
Unemployed population  –0.015* (0.008) 
Poverty population  0.005* (0.002) 
Gini index of income inequality 0.730* (0.360) 
Constant 0.002*** (0.000) 
State fixed effects Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  
AIC 250,757.45              
BIC 251,411.07              
N 45,023              
Note. Coefficients from negative binomial regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. The reference group for public and nonprofit nursing 
homes is for-profit homes. The reference group for certification status is nursing homes certified by 






Table A.3. Divergence in Quality of Care Under Market Competition  
Dependent variable = Overall quality rating 
 Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE 
Public home 0.360*** (0.057) –0.163 (0.119) 
Nonprofit home 0.545*** (0.035) –0.079 (0.101) 
Lagged market competition –0.075 (0.078) –0.332*** (0.090) 
Public home × Lagged market 
competition 
  0.740*** (0.161) 
Nonprofit home × Lagged 
market competition 
  0.774*** (0.121) 
Number of certified beds  –0.012*** (0.001) –0.012*** (0.001) 
Number of residents  0.009*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.001) 
Staffing hours  0.584*** (0.028) 0.581*** (0.028) 
Years since certification  –0.002+ (0.001) –0.002 (0.001) 
Changed ownership –0.357*** (0.051) –0.358*** (0.051) 
Certification: Medicare only 0.456*** (0.078) 0.437*** (0.079) 
Certification: Medicaid only 0.367*** (0.096) 0.403*** (0.096) 
Hospital affiliated home  –0.502*** (0.072) –0.447*** (0.074) 
Population density  0.070*** (0.011) 0.070*** (0.011) 
Elderly population  0.009+ (0.005) 0.010+ (0.006) 
White population  0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 
Population without health 
insurance 
–0.003 (0.008) –0.002 (0.008) 
Unemployed population  0.025 (0.021) 0.022 (0.021) 
Poverty population  –0.027*** (0.006) –0.029*** (0.006) 
Gini index of income inequality 0.295 (0.983) 0.383 (0.975) 
State fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
AIC 173,543.80  173,422.94              
BIC 174,217.18  174,114.28              
N 58,595  58,595  
Note. Coefficients from ordered logit regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by county and shown in parentheses. The reference group for public and nonprofit nursing 
homes is for-profit homes. The reference group for certification status is nursing homes certified by 











Internal management   
I involve nursing and other non-managerial staff in my nursing home’s 
decision-making process. 
0.76 
Residents’ and families’ feedback and outcomes are taken into 
consideration when revising policies. 
0.77 
Non-manager feedback is taken into consideration when revising policies. 0.77 
The information I receive from others regarding operations and 
performance matches my own perceptions. 
0.50 
I give my senior staff a great deal of discretion in making decisions. 0.49 
I often reconcile disagreements within our nursing home. 0.41 
Eigenvalue = 2.41  
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.68  
Exploiting the environment  
Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new ideas and 
practices. 
0.89 
Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new technology. 0.85 
We continually search for new opportunities to provide services to our 
community. 
0.77 
Eigenvalue = 2.10  
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78  
Buffering the environment  
My role is to respond to various events and disturbances in the external 
environment of our nursing home.  
0.52 
I always try to limit the influence of external events on the staff and 
nurses. 
0.78 
I strive to control those factors outside the nursing home that could have 
an effect on my organization. 
0.85 
Eigenvalue = 1.59  






Table A.5. Factor-Analytical Results: Managerial Networking 
Survey Question: As a Nursing Home Administrator, how frequently do you interact 
with the following organizations and persons? 
Never = 1; Yearly = 2; Monthly = 3; Weekly = 4; More Than Once a Week= 5; Daily 
= 6 





State regulatory agencies 0.15 0.84 
State and local public officials 0.12 0.85 
State Medicaid   0.76 0.22 
Medicare intermediaries   0.84 0.17 
Insurance companies 0.83 0.07 
Information/assistive technology vendors 0.62 0.12 
Variance 2.40 1.52 
Proportion 0.40 0.25 






Table A.6. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables: Chapter 3 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max Source 
Dependent variable       
Five-star quality rating  3.65 1.23 1 5 NHC 
Independent variable       
Public home (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.34 - 0 1 NHC 
Nonprofit home (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.36 - 0 1 NHC 
For-profit home (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.30 - 0 1 NHC 
Internal management 0.00 0.95 –3.62 1.77 Survey 
Exploiting the environment 0.00 0.96 –3.06 1.94 Survey 
Buffering the environment 0.00 0.98 –3.24 2.33 Survey 
Political networking 0.00 0.84 –2.53 5.31 Survey 
Financial networking 0.00 0.84 –2.07 4.01 Survey 
Managerial stability (years) 7.25 7.75 0 48 Survey 
Facility-level controls      
Number of certified beds  100.30 69.34 10 720 NHC 
Number of residents  84.92 64.30 3 694 NHC 
Staffing hours  4.37 1.65 1.63 51.26 NHC 
Years since certification  25.22 12.05 2 50 NHC 
Changed ownership during past 12 
months (yes = 1; no = 0) 
0.02 - 0 1 NHC 
Certification: Medicare and Medicaid 0.88 - 0 1 NHC 
Certification: Medicare only  0.04 - 0 1 NHC 
Certification: Medicaid only  0.08 - 0 1 NHC 
Hospital affiliated home (yes = 1; no = 
0) 
0.11 - 0 1 NHC 
County-level controls      
Population density per sq. mile (in 
1,000s) 
0.83 3.37 0.00 72.17 ACS 
Percentage of elderly population (%) 16.11 4.27 6.69 37.62 ACS 
Percentage of white population (%) 83.34 15.35 17.14 99.61 ACS 
No health insurance population (%) 12.28 5.18 2.15 36.41 ACS 
Unemployed population (%) 4.71 1.76 0.42 11.87 ACS 
Poverty population (%) 13.99 4.87 2.49 37.85 ACS 
Gini index of income inequality 0.44 0.03 0.34 0.60 ACS 
Market competition 0.70 0.29 0.00 1.00 NHC 





Table A.7. Managerial Stability, Buffering, and Performance  
Dependent variable = Overall five-star quality rating 
 Public Nonprofit For-profit 
Managerial stability 0.029* 0.007 0.024    
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)    
Buffering –0.346** 0.112 –0.022    
 (0.129) (0.152) (0.172)    
Buffering × Managerial stability 0.025* –0.002 0.018    
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)    
Exploiting 0.166 0.219+ 0.281*   
 (0.124) (0.127) (0.121)    
Controls included Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
AIC 1,229.96 1,273.51 1,187.80    
BIC 1,518.48 1,553.09 1,439.80    
N 430 451 379    
Note. Coefficients from ordered logit regression analysis are reported. Robust standard errors are 






Table A.8. HCAHPS Survey Questions 
Nurse communication  
During this hospital stay how often did nurses treat you with courtesy and respect? 
During this hospital stay how often did nurses listen carefully to you? 
During this hospital stay how often did nurses explain things in a way you could 
understand? 
Doctor communication  
During this hospital stay, how often did doctors treat you with courtesy and respect? 
During this hospital stay, how often did doctors listen carefully to you? 
During this hospital stay, how often did doctors explain things in a way you could 
understand? 
Responsiveness of hospital staff 
During this hospital stay, after you pressed the call button, how often did you get help 
as soon as you wanted it? 
How often did you get help in getting to the bathroom or in using a bedpan as soon as 
you wanted? 
Pain management 
During this hospital stay, how often was your pain well controlled? 
During this hospital stay, how often did the hospital staff do everything they could to 
help you with your pain? 
Communication about medicine 
Before giving you any new medicine how often did hospital staff tell you what the 
medicine was for? 
Before giving you any new medicine how often did hospital staff describe possible 
side effects in a way you could understand? 
Discharge information  
During this hospital stay, did doctors, nurses or other hospital staff talk with you 
about whether you would have the help you needed when you left the hospital? 
During this hospital stay, did you get information in writing about what symptoms or 
health problems to look out for after you left the hospital? 
Cleanliness and quietness of hospital environment 
During this hospital stay, how often were your room and bathroom kept clean? 
During this hospital stay, how often was the area around your room quiet at night? 
Overall rating of hospital  
Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst hospital possible and 10 is the 






Table A.9. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables: Chapter 4 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max Source 
Dependent variable       
Patient satisfaction  42.14 18.04 3 98 HC 
Independent variable       
Public hospital (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.13 - 0 1 AHA 
Nonprofit hospital (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.71 - 0 1 AHA 
For-profit hospital (yes = 1; no = 0) 0.16 - 0 1 AHA 
Clinical process 59.75 18.03 0 100 HC 
Outcome score 31.70 20.62 0 100 HC 
30-day readmission rates  19.79 1.29 15.93 26.85 HC 
Facility-level controls      
Total employees (logged)  6.74 0.95 4.33 10.19 AHA 
Total employees per 10 beds (logged) 3.86 0.43 2.02 5.34 AHA 
Medicaid discharges (logged) 7.12 1.23 0 10.48 AHA 
Medicare discharges (logged) 8.16 1.03 0 10.63 AHA 
Fulltime RNs (%) 28.08 8.12 0 64.36 AHA 
Technical support (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.23 - 0 1 AHA 
Acute beds (%) 0.22 2.88 0 65.70 AHA 
Rural hospitals (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.14 - 0 1 AHA 
County-level controls      
Market competition 13.66 5.61 1 29 AHA 
Population density (logged) 5.92 1.62 1.36 11.17 ACS 
Poverty rates (%) 14.96 5.42 3.53 43.25 ACS 
Unemployed population (%) 5.91 1.54 1.17 12.22 ACS 
No health insurance coverage (%) 14.35 5.49 2.52 45.71 ACS 




Table A.10. The Effect of Market Competition and Ownership on Performance   
DVs   Process Outcome  Readmission  
Public hospital –9.772* –5.945 0.221 
 (4.109) (4.053) (0.239) 
Nonprofit hospital –6.723* –2.779 0.024 
 (3.039) (3.330) (0.181) 
Market competition –0.065 –0.411* 0.027* 
 (0.180) (0.193) (0.011) 
Public hospital × Market competition 0.082 0.444+ –0.025 
 (0.258) (0.270) (0.017) 
Nonprofit hospital × Market competition 0.131 0.208 –0.021+ 
 (0.196) (0.213) (0.013) 
Total employees  –1.418 2.339* –0.382*** 
 (1.077) (1.080) (0.065) 
Total employees per 10 beds  1.355 1.211 0.203* 
 (1.356) (1.341) (0.081) 
Medicaid discharges –0.728 –1.593* 0.278*** 
 (0.672) (0.675) (0.042) 
Medicare discharges 1.012 4.047*** –0.228*** 
 (0.855) (0.962) (0.049) 
Fulltime RNs 0.156* 0.057 –0.005 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.004) 
Technical support  0.319 –0.534 –0.051 
 (0.976) (1.109) (0.064) 
Acute beds –0.467* 0.204 0.009 
 (0.188) (0.151) (0.008) 
Rural hospitals  0.474 –1.712 –0.024 
 (1.400) (1.337) (0.087) 
Population density 1.459*** 1.634*** 0.135*** 
 (0.381) (0.423) (0.024) 
Poverty rate –0.342*** 0.066 0.022*** 
 (0.100) (0.107) (0.007) 
Unemployed rate –0.417 –0.153 0.076* 
 (0.441) (0.452) (0.029) 
No health insurance 0.303+ 0.487** –0.003 
 (0.169) (0.166) (0.010) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.164 0.241 
N 1,925 1,925 1,924 
Note. Reference for ownership is for-profit hospitals. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. + p < 
0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
